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NEVER CONSTRUED TO THEIR
PREJUDICE: IN HONOR OF DAVID
GETCHES
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
This article reviews and analyzes the judicial canons of
construction for Native American treaties and statutes. It
discusses their theoretical justifications and practical
applications. It concludes that the treaty canon has ready
support in contract law and the law of treaty interpretation.
Justification of the statutory canon is more challenging and
could be strengthened by attention to the democratic deficit
when Congress imposes laws on Indian country.
Applications of the canons have mattered in disputes
between Indian nations and private or state interests. They
have made much less difference, and have suffered major
failings, in disputes with the federal government. Recent
Supreme Court decisions restricting tribal sovereignty show
significant weakening of the canons.
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INTRODUCTION
Numerous judicial opinions recite that ambiguities in
treaties with Indian nations and in federal statutes relating to
Indians and tribes should be interpreted in their favor.1 Can
these canons be justified? If they can, have they mattered?
The treaty canon has strong theoretical support in contract
law and the law of treaty interpretation, domestic and
international. 2 By resolving unclear wording in tribes' favor,
the rule has effectively helped tribes to preserve their resources
and sovereignty over their members against opposing private
and state interests.3 However, the Supreme Court has ignored
the canon in recent rulings divesting tribes of jurisdiction over
nonmembers in tribal territory. 4 In addition, the treaty rule
has been much less effective in disputes between tribes and the
federal government. The Supreme Court dishonored it in major
decisions denying constitutional protection of tribal land
1. See NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (2005) [hereinafter 2005 COHEN].
2. See infra Part II.A and text accompanying notes 24-38.
3. See infra Part II. B.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
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ownership. 5
Theoretical grounding for the statutory canon is less clear.
The statutory rule is supported by the trust relationship
between the United States and the Indian nations arising from
treaties, but the extent of the government's trust duties is
contested and uncertain. 6 The canon is also supported by
democratic theory. Until recently, when Congress imposed laws
on Indian country, it lacked any normal political restraint.
However, application of general federal laws to Native
Americans may differ according to context. Some laws uniquely
impact Indians and Indian tribes and thus lack political
restraint. Other laws apply alike to Indian interests and to
those of other citizens and governments and are subject to
normal democratic forces. 7
Like its treaty counterpart, the statutory canon has
effectively helped tribes in disputes against private and state
interests.8 But again, the rule has been much less effective
against the federal government. Decisions defining remedies
for taking tribal land and other resources have often been
stingy or nonexistent. 9
The next section is a brief history of the two canons. The
two sections that follow discuss the origins, theory, and
applications of both canons, first the treaty rule, then its
statutory counterpart. To highlight significant differences,
discussions of the canons' applications address disputes
between Native Americans and state or private interests
separately from disputes between Indians and the federal
government. The article's fourth section addresses the canons'
deteriorating force in Supreme Court decisions since 1975.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Native American rights and obligations arise from treaties,
federal statutes, and the Constitution itself. 10 It follows that
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 130-44.
7. See infra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 145-61.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Part III.C.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2; 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES
(1904); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1-4307 (2006). Early Supreme Court opinions applied inter-
national law to interpret Indian treaties, and in recent years, Native Americans
have made modern international law claims. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §
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interpretation of federal laws is a paramount concern of
Indians and tribes, and of others who interact with them. Prior
to 1959, interpretation was mostly administrative, left to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and other federal agencies, and in
some contexts to the tribes themselves.II But occasional
judicial opinions since the Marshall Court have reasoned that
ambiguous treaties with tribes should be interpreted in their
favor. 12 When Felix Cohen and his Interior team organized
federal Indian law in 1941, they generalized the treaty cases
into a "cardinal rule."1 3 The Cohen Handbook applied the same
rule to federal statutes that ratify agreements with tribes made
after treaty making ended. 14 The treatise did not address
whether ambiguities in other federal statutes should be
interpreted in favor of Indian rights; at the time it was
published, only one important Supreme Court decision had
relied on such a rule. 1 When the Interior Department
published its vulgate version of the treatise in 1958, its
statement of the interpretive rule for treaties and treaty
equivalents was unchanged, and nothing was added on
statutory interpretation.16 Thereafter, judicial opinions that
recited a statutory rule became more common, and by the time
5.07. The early decisions are sound precedents, but neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress appear likely to embrace the modern movement for the foreseeable
future. For discussion of the subject, compare Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating
Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 78-79 (1996) (advocating reliance on
international law), with Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in
Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Inte-
gration, 8 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 43 (2003) (doubting the efficacy of Frickey's ap-
proach).
11. The year 1959 is often recited as the onset of significant modern renewal
of Indian rights. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND
THE LAW 1 (1987).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 21-23.
13. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37 (1941) [hereinafter 1941
COHEN]. On Cohen's importance to federal Indian law, see Symposium in Honor of Felix S.
Cohen, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 355, 356 (1954).
14. See 1941 COHEN, supra note 13, at 37 n.45. Recent agreements between
tribes and the government are made under very different conditions. Tribal par-
ties are now versed in English and represented by lawyers. But most agreements
contested at law were made long before these changes. See infra notes 59-88,
147-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25 (discussing United States v.
Reily, 290 U.S. 33, 39 (1933)); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78,
89 (1918); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1909).
16. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 145-48
(1958). Scholars consider this edition heavily biased in favor of the federal gov-
ernment's interests. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND ET AL., FELIX S. COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at ix (1982) [hereinafter 1982 COHEN].
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the 1982 revision of Cohen's Handbook was published, the
treatise rightly stated the statutory rule to be an established
canon of interpretation. 17 The 2005 revision of Cohen's treatise
further elaborated and solidified the statutory canon's place as
an established rule of interpretation. 18 However, modern
Supreme Court decisions against Indian interests have caused
a number of scholars to assert both canons' demise.19 The next
two sections expand this history to analyze each canon's origin,
theory, and applications.
II. THE TREATY CANON
This section discusses the treaty canon in depth. Its first
part relates the canon's origin in nineteenth century Supreme
Court decisions and identifies the canon's strong support in
legal theory based on both treaty and contract law. The
section's second part discusses the canon's major applications
to disputes between Native Americans and state and private
interests. It concludes that the canon has been important in
decisions protecting Indian resources and sovereignty. The
third part addresses the canon's application to disputes
between Indians and the federal government. It concludes that
the canon has been much less effective in these matters and
was dishonored by the Supreme Court's failure to accord timely
constitutional protection to tribal land ownership.
A. Origin and Theory
The Court's 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia is the
bedrock of the Indian sovereignty doctrine, and Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion for the Court is one of his crowning
achievements. 20 Justice M'Lean's concurring opinion is
commonly cited as the point of origin for the treaty canon.
M'Lean wrote:
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never
17. 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 223-25.
18. 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 2.02-.03.
19. See infra notes 77, 87, 280, 312-13, 324, 341 and accompanying text (cit-
ing articles by symposium honoree David H. Getches and by Nell Jessup Newton,
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bethany R. Berger, Sarah Krakoff, Samuel E. Ennis, Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Philip P. Frickey, Joseph William Singer, and Peter C.
Maxfield).
20. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). See infra text accompanying notes 40-47.
5
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be construed to their prejudice. If words be made use of,
which are susceptible of a more extended meaning than
their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty,
they should be considered as used only in the latter sense.21
Later opinions of the full Court adopted Justice M'Lean's
statement, making it into Cohen's "cardinal rule" of treaty
interpretation. 22 A variation on the rule that appears in many
decisions requires that treaty terms be interpreted as the
Indians understood them because treaties were written only in
English, so that Indian parties' understanding depended on
oral interpreters who had to render legal concepts. 23 The
precedents do not support a significant difference in the two
formulations. Both look for a plausible interpretation favorable
to the Indian party.
The treaty canon has strong theoretical backing. A fair
case can be made that requiring interpretation in the Indians'
favor is simply shorthand for applying contract and treaty
rules of interpretation to the context of Indian treaties. The
actual agreements were oral, negotiated through interpreters
hired by the United States. 24 The agreements were
memorialized in writing in a language understood only by the
government side. 25 The rule that ambiguities in writings be
construed against the drafter, however controversial in some
situations, should surely apply. 26 And there can be no doubt
21. Id. at 582 (M'Lean, J., concurring). My title cribs him.
22. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 (1902); Jones
v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899); In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 760 (1867).
The latter opinion mistakenly attributed the quote to Marshall, and the error was
repeated by reference in Carpenter and Choate. Other notable opinions relying on
the rule include Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) and United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905). Carpenter, Choate, and Winters
involved statutes ratifying agreements with tribes, that is, treaty equivalents. The
others interpreted treaties.
23. E.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979);
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899). See also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551 ("There is
the more reason for supposing that the Cherokee chiefs were not very critical
judges of the language, from the fact that every one makes his mark; no chief was
capable of signing his name. It is probable the treaty was interpreted to them.").
24. For extensive description of the process, see FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES (1994).
25. See id.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981). On controversy
about the rule, see, for example, Michael B. Rappaport, Ambiguity Rule and In-
surance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed against the
6 [Vol. 84
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that parol evidence should be freely admitted; the treaty texts
recorded agreements that were essentially oral, and they never
purported to be integrations. 27 As the Supreme Court has
observed, Indian treaties resembled international protectorate
treaties, and there is authority for interpretation to favor the
weaker party.28 Modern treaty and contract rules of
interpretation demand good faith. 29 Considered together, these
rules require an effort to ascertain and honor the reasonable
expectations of the Indian parties.
Because of the language advantage enjoyed by the United
States, reasonable expectations of the treaty parties cannot
rest on technical parsing of treaty terms. 30 Rather,
expectations must be deduced from context. Tribal
understandings can be determined from pre-existing tribal
ownership. Tribes always sought to retain their land,
sovereignty over retained territory, and rights to continue
traditional economic activities that depended on natural
resources: hunting, fishing, farming, and gathering.3 1 The
United States always sought to take away part of what the
tribal party had. 32 In exchange, it offered payment for ceded
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995-1996). See generally Pter Cserne, Policy con-
siderations in contract interpretation: the contra proferentem rule from a compara-
tive law and economics perspective, in CONTRACT THEORY - CORPORATE LAW 66,
66-104 (Gavvala Radhika ed., 2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/peter-c
serne/28.
27. See-RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (1981). Treaty law has
not observed a formal parol evidence rule, but it requires interpreting terms "in
their context and in light of [the treaty's] objects and purpose." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987).
Parol evidence is admitted for these purposes. See generally IVIARK E. VILLIGER,
COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 421-
49 (2009); RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 301-50 (2008).
28. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61 ("the settled doctrine of the law of nations is,
that a weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self gov-
ernment, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state,
in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more
powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a
state."). See also D. P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-57 (2d ed. 1970).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201(2),
205 (1981). For discussion in the international context, see GARDINER, supra note
27, at 147-61.
30. International treaty law has extensive precedents and literature on the
problem of treaties written in more than one language. For discussion of the prob-
lem of translating technical terms, see GARDINER, supra note 27, at 369-75.
31. See PRUCHA, supra note 24.
32. See id.
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lands and protection of territory that tribes retained. 33
Other basic rules of treaty and contract law provide that
no valid agreement results from fraud or coerced consent. 34
Tribal consent to treaties was at times impaired by fraud and
often involved at least some degree of coercion from the implied
threat that settlers would otherwise overwhelm tribes. An
Indian Service veteran observed, "The method of making the
treaties varied according to the character of the commissioners
negotiating for them. Some were manifestly fraudulent . . . .
Others were signed by the Indians practically under duress."35
These factors alone would not always be enough to vitiate
consent, but they are reason enough to interpret ambiguities in
favor of Indian expectations. At times, outright coercion was
manifest, particularly when treaties were imposed on tribes
following their military defeat. 36 Agreements based on fraud or
coercion are not enforceable, but that remedy is useless for
tribes. 37 The best a court can do to protect Indian rights is to
resolve ambiguities in an imposed treaty against the United
States.
The treaty canon should not be jettisoned simply because
33. See id.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 331(1)(b), (2)(a) (1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 174-175 (1981). In international law, see generally STUART S. MALAWER,
IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977).
35. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, ITS
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 59 (1927), quoted in 1941 COHEN, supra
note 13, at 37 (describing an 1808 Osage treaty); see also David Williams, Legiti-
mation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and Community in Fed-
eral Indian Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 403, 452 (1994) ("The history of United States-
Indian relations thus reveals very few occasions in which treaties were negotiated
under market-like conditions. As soon as the Bluecoats' propensity for violence
became known, it served as the background to every treaty. Every tribal leader
knew that if negotiations fell through, the most likely alternative was war.") (cita-
tion omitted).
36. Notable examples are treaties imposed on midwestern tribes following the
1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers and treaties imposed on the Five Civilized Tribes
after the Civil War, each of which included at least factions that sided with the
South. See PRUCHA, supra note 24, at 91-93, 264-68. Another notorious incidence
of coercion was the process of removal of southeastern tribes in the 1830s. See
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1970) ("[Tlreaties were im-
posed upon them and they had no choice but to consent."); Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 119 U.S. 1, 37 (1886) ("It is notorious as a historical fact, as it
abundantly appears from the record in this case, that great pressure had to be
brought to bear upon the Indians to effect their removal . . . ."). Yet another was
the imposed agreement that took the Black Hills. See United States v. Sioux Na-
tion, 448 U.S. 371, 382 n.13 (1980).
37. The principal obstacle to a judicial remedy would be statutes of limita-
tions. See infra notes 105, 202, 214, 224, 269 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 84
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general rules of treaty and contract interpretation may
theoretically be adequate to .the just resolution of contests
about treaty meaning. The canon is a core part of the trust
relationship that is firmly established as federal policy.3 8
Moreover, it is often difficult to prove the particular
circumstances of a treaty's negotiation over a century after its
making. The effect of the canon is to place the burden on
opponents of Indian claims to prove uncoerced Indian consent
to yield the asset at issue. This is an appropriate rule in light of
the language barrier and the prevalence of at least some degree
of duress. The canon also forces courts to try to understand the
unfamiliar, Indian side of a case, and it stiffens the spines of
uncertain judges when prevailing politics run against Indian
interests.
B. Applications to Disputes with State and Private
Interests
The treaty canon has often been effective when Indian
interests conflicted with those of states or private parties.39
But it has had significant failures when tribes challenged fed-
eral authority. One might say that the Supremacy Clause has
been an Indian ally against state and private interests, but a
liability against the feds.
Worcester v. Georgia40 remains the most important and
impressive decision interpreting treaties to carry out the
Indians' understanding. Georgia had aggressively tried to
impose state laws on Cherokee treaty territory in the state.41
But the Court held that the Cherokee treaties preserved
Cherokee sovereignty over tribal territory, in which "the laws
of Georgia can have no- force." 42 Marshall's opinion relied
almost exclusively on the earliest of thirteen Cherokee treaties,
made when the Cherokees had bargaining power as potential
allies of American enemies and thus the most freely made. 43 It
38. See infra text accompanying notes 130-44.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 40-57.
40. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
41. Id. at 521-28.
42. Id. at 520.
43. Id. at 551-55 (interpreting the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell). The 1791 Treaty
of Holston, second of the thirteen, was discussed at 555-56. No later treaty was
cited. For a list of Cherokee treaties, see Cherokee Treaties, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCherokee-treaties (last updated May 28, 2012). The
list includes treaties with colonies, the British Crown, American states, and other
9
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then meticulously analyzed possible meanings of every relevant
treaty term and construed all in favor of tribal authority. 44 It
crucially read the treaties as self-executing, that is, directly
enforceable by courts.45 All this was done in the teeth of the
political winds of the day. Andrew Jackson had been elected on
an anti-Indian platform and had dedicated himself to tribes'
removal from proximity to white settlers.46 Justice Baldwin's
banal dissent shows how easily a politically compliant Court
could have decided otherwise. 47
Worcester's interpretation of the Cherokee treaties to
retain tribal sovereignty was extended by political action and
judicial decision to all recognized tribes, including those with
less favorable treaty terms or with no treaty at all.48 Thus,
parties, as well as many United States treaties dated after Worcester. The count of
thirteen includes only treaties with the United States predating the Worcester de-
cision.
44. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551-55; see also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past
and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian
Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 398-405 (1993) (reviewing the Court's analysis).
45. English law required and requires an Act of Parliament for judicial en-
forcement of treaties. See 8(2) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 236 n.2 (4th ed.
reissue 1996). By contrast, the Supreme Court interpreted our Constitution to
permit direct judicial enforcement so long as treaty terms are suitable, which the
Court calls self-executing terms. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796). The Worcester Court did not discuss the point but as-
sumed that Indian treaties were subject to the same rule by its conclusion that
the laws of Georgia at issue were "repugnant" to the Cherokee treaties. 31 U.S. at
561-62. (Counsel for Worcester and Butler did cite Ware. Id. at 535.) Had Ameri-
can courts adopted the English rule, American Indian treaties would likely have
become a dead letter, at least after the election of President Jackson. On direct
enforcement generally, see D. P. O'CONNELL, supra note 28, at 54-65.
46. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON: THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM, 1822-1832 117, 200 (1998); Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A
Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L.REV. 500, 528-29 (1969).
47. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562. Justice Baldwin dissented by reference to his
prior opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 31 (1831), in which he
opined that the Cherokee Nation had no status as a government. Justice Johnson
wrote a similar opinion in the earlier case, 30 U.S. at 20, but did not dissent in
Worcester.
48. See 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 224. Federal statutes relating to tribal
sovereignty, such as §§ 16-17 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 476-477 (2006), have never differentiated between treaty tribes and others.
Numerous modern statutes continue this policy. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §
1.07. However, tribal ownership based on treaties and statutes has better legal
protection than that based on original title or executive orders. See infra text ac-
companying notes 233-63. But see Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The
Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141
(2005); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069
(2004) (both advocating departure from the policy). Alaska and Hawaii are excep-
tions to the policy described here; each has a distinct legal history. See Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (state law preferring Native Hawaiians unconstitu-
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while tribal sovereignty has been restricted in various ways, its
dimensions have not depended on having a treaty or on
particular treaty terms. 49 The Supreme Court also reasoned
that the tribal sovereignty doctrine includes tribal immunity
from suit, similar to the sovereign immunity of the federal
government.50
A remarkable application of the treaty canon to disputes
with state and private interests arose in the Supreme Court's
1908 Winters decision recognizing Indian water rights.5' A
federal statute ratified an agreement with a tribe; neither the
text of the agreement nor that of the statute said anything
about water, but the Court inferred reservation of water rights
to carry out Indian expectations. 52 Other prominent decisions
that relied on the treaty canon were lawsuits defining treaty
provisions that retained Indian rights to hunt and fish on
former tribal land. Though results are mixed and decisions
cannot be reconciled, tribes won most cases and all of the
important ones, and decisions often relied on the treaty
canon. 53 Most notable were the northwestern fishing rights
decisions. Treaties with Washington tribes ceded most of their
land but retained explicit rights to fish off-reservation at usual
and accustomed sites in common with settlers. 54 The Supreme
Court successively interpreted these provisions to imply
easements of access to the sites,55 immunity from state
regulations other than those necessary to preserve fish
species, 56 and Indian entitlement to a generous fixed share of
tional racial discrimination); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522
U.S. 520 (1998) (Alaskan Native Villages not Indian country as dependant Indian
communities); Alaska v. Native Village of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734 (Alaska 2011)
(history of native village sovereignty); Heather Kendall-Miller, Alaska v. Native
Village of Tanana: Enhancing Tribal Power by Affirming Concurrent Tribal Ju-
risdiction to Initiate ICWA-Defined Child Custody Proceedings, Both Inside and
Outside of Indian Country, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 217 (2011) (same).
49. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 7.05[1]. The treatise opines that tribal
sovereign immunity derives from federal common law and the Constitution rather
than Worcester. See id. A full analysis needs all sources: federal sovereign immu-
nity rests on federal common law and the Constitution; Worcester attaches that
theory to tribal sovereignty.
51. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (interpreting stat-
ute ratifying agreement with tribe, that is, a treaty equivalent). On Indian water
rights generally, see 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 19.01-.06.
52. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
53. See generally 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 18.04.
54. Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 661-62 (1979).
55. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1905).
56. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (Indians do not need state li-
11
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up to half the catch.57
The treaty canon's most important application today is in
major disputes about the scope of tribal sovereignty. These
issues command a full discussion later in this paper. 58
C. Applications to Disputes with the Federal Government
In contrast to the treaty canon's support for Indians' rights
in their disputes with state and private parties, the Court has
honored the canon much less often when reviewing Native
American claims against the federal government. The Court's
clearest failure to honor Indians' reasonable treaty
expectations was its refusal to accord tribal land ownership
constitutional protection against federal takings until it was
too late to have much beneficial effect. Until 1887, tribal land
cessions were nominally consensual, by treaty or other
agreement. 59 Some deals involved enough coercion to support a
takings claim, and much land was simply seized, 60 but no suit
was filed, or at least none that generated a reported decision.
In lawsuits relating to present or former tribal land, Supreme
Court opinions recited conflicting dicta on the nature of tribal
land ownership.6 1 At various times, tribal ownership was
ambiguously called a "right of occupancy" with "a legal as well
as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according
to their own discretion;" or robustly characterized to be "as
I sacred as the fee simple of the whites;" or dismissed as no
ownership at all. 62 No decision had raised a takings issue.
From 1880, Congress passed a series of so-called allotment
laws whose purpose was to eliminate tribal common land by
cense); Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (states can regu-
late tribal fishing when necessary to preserve species, but regulations may not
discriminate against Indians).
57. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 690.
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[1].
60. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 108-14 (1984). At times the Senate
refused to ratify treaties of cession, resulting in seizure. See PRUCHA, supra note
24, at 558 (index entry for unratified treaties citing numerous entries).
61. See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) ("The native tribes .
have never been . . . regarded as the owners of the territories they respectively
occupied."); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). Mitchel was authored by Justice Baldwin and
quoted from his prior opinion that had denied tribal sovereignty. See Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 48 (1831).
62. See supra note 61.
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conveying some to tribal members individually and selling the
rest to settlers. 63 Most important was the General Allotment
Act of 1887, which mandated allotment of most tribal land. 64
The Act provided for individual Indians to choose their
allotments, so common practice was to seek tribal consent to an
allotment scheme, then to have Congress ratify each
agreement. 65 But some schemes were simply imposed, and
others included altered provisions inflicted on unconsenting
tribes. 66
While allotment injustices simmered, the Supreme Court
rendered its first opinion on tribal land ownership and the
Takings Clause in a case unrelated to allotment. An 1884
statute granted a railroad the power to condemn a right-of-way
across Cherokee territory upon payment of just
compensation. 67 The Cherokee Nation sued the railroad,
claiming that the United States lacked power to condemn its
treaty land and, in the alternative, that the statute's
procedures did not adequately guarantee payment of just
compensation as the Constitution required. 68 The Supreme
Court upheld federal power of eminent domain. 69 But the Court
interpreted the statute to assure just compensation to the
Cherokees, and Justice Harlan's opinion for a unanimous Court
clearly assumed that tribal ownership was protected by the
63. See 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 130-34, 612-14. From 1854, many
treaties had provided for voluntary allotment. See, e.g., Lykins v. McGrath, 184
U.S. 169 (1902). The first allotment statute appears to be the Act of June 15,
1880, ch. 228, 21 Stat. 199, 200 (Ute tribes).
64. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (formerly codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-33). Some tribes were excepted from the statute but brought un-
der the policy separately; some tribes avoided allotment altogether. See 2005
COHEN, supra note 1, § 16.03[2][b].
65. Act of Feb 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 2, 24 Stat. 388 (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 332); see 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 613. The wholesale nature of the process
is shown by several statutes passed in the 1890s that ratified numerous allotment
agreements. E.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, §§ 8-31, 26 Stat. 989, 1016-43
(seven agreements).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74, 293, 301-02, 304, and 306;
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE ASSAULT ON INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE GENERAL
ALLOTMENT LAW (DAWES ACT) OF 1887 49-60 (1975); DELOS SACKETT OTIS, THE
DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 82-97 (reprint 1973).
67. Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 179, 23 Stat. 73.
68. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kans. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
69. Id. at 653-57. The Cherokees' case was based on the general concept of
retained tribal sovereignty rather than on any specific treaty provision, and on
the claim that Congress cannot override a treaty. See id. at 648-49. It thus de-
pended on inferring constitutional status to tribal sovereignty, a claim beyond the
scope of the treaty canon. See text accompanying notes 77 and 250.
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Takings Clause. 70
In 1903, the allotment laws at last generated a decision on
constitutional protection of tribal land ownership. The
prominent decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock dishonored the
treaty canon. 7 1 In 1900, Congress ratified a purported 1892
agreement with Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes that
provided for conveyance of reservation common land to
individual tribal members as allotments and for sale of most of
the rest at a set price. 72 However, the agreement was
apparently made in violation of the 1867 treaty that
established the reservation. 73 The tribes also claimed that
consent to the agreement had been obtained by fraud, and the
set price for land sale was much too low. 74 They sued to enjoin
implementation, but a unanimous Supreme Court rejected
their claim outright.7 5
Lone Wolfs holding had two parts: first, that Congress had
power to override the Indian treaty, and second, that it could
do so without complying with the Fifth Amendment. 76 Modern
critics argue that the Court should have implied a
constitutional barrier to congressional power to override Indian
treaties. 77 That is a difficult claim because congressional power
to override foreign treaties was and is well-established, 78 the
Court had previously sustained overrides of Indian treaty
70. Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 657-61.
71. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
72. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, § 6, 31 Stat. 672, 676-81.
73. The treaty required tribal approval of allotment or other conveyance by at
least three-fourths of eligible voters. The federal negotiators reported that three-
fourths had approved, but in 1899 the Senate asked the Interior Secretary to re-
view the issue, and he reported that the vote taken had fallen short. Later that
year the tribes voted to repudiate the 1892 agreement. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at
554-58. In any case, the Court proceeded on the assumption that Congress had
acted without tribal consent.
74. Id. at 560-61.
75. Id. at 553.
76. Id. at 564.
77. See, e.g., Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1598-99 (2004); Robert N. Clinton, There
is no Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002);
Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autono-
my and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981); Frickey, supra note 10, at
55-56; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 236-47 (1984); cf. Frickey, supra note 44, at
405-49 (arguing for a "quasi-constitutional" rule of clear statement in favor of
tribal sovereignty); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not so Little) Con-
stitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
271, 285 (2003) (advocating adoption of a constitutional amendment).
78. E.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893).
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rights several times,79 and it has consistently reaffirmed those
rulings. 80 Modern international law authorities reject
legitimacy of overrides while acknowledging contrary national
laws.8 ' However, the Supreme Court has not been receptive to
any claimed limit on the power, international or domestic. 82
The Lone Wolf Court's failure to accord Fifth Amendment
protection to tribal property was another matter. Because the
tribes' claim sought to enjoin the scheme rather than recover
damages for a taking, their counsels' arguments stressed the
Due Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause, claiming
both substantive and procedural violations. 83 Justice White's
dreadful opinion for the Court referred only to the Fifth
Amendment, citing neither clause. 84 The Court's first response
was packed into the statement that "[p1lenary authority over
the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by
79. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (sustaining federal
power to lease tribal land for oil extraction); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174
U.S. 445, 483-86 (1899) (sustaining power to determine tribal membership);
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (sustaining power
to take Cherokee land by eminent domain); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616
(1871) (sustaining statute overriding treaty tax exemption). Treaty rights were
also overridden in Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 270-72 (1897) (sustaining power
to incorporate tribal land into Oklahoma Territory in violation of treaty); Ward v.
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896) (sustaining repeal of treaty hunting right);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (sustaining federal power to prose-
cute tribal Indian); and United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) (sustain-
ing federal power to prosecute adopted Cherokee), although in none was a treaty
tribe party to the case.
80. E.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324
(2011).
81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 332 & Reporters Note 1 (1987); VILLIGER, supra note 27, at 541,
547.
82. Justice Thomas questioned the extent of federal power over Indian affairs
in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214-27 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
However, he almost surely favors curbing federal power in favor of state, not trib-
al, authority; in all divided decisions on states versus tribes during his tenure, he
has voted against tribal sovereignty. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327 (2008); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,
281 (2001); Minnesota v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 220
(1999); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421 (1994); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508
U.S. 679, 694 (1993).
83. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903). Additionally, see the
plaintiffs' argument in the decision below, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 19 App. D.C.
315, 316-20 (1902), aff'd, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). Plaintiffs could not join a claim for
injunction with one for damages. Cherokee Nation v. S. Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S.
at 651-53 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 67-70). Moreover, a takings
claim would have encountered sovereign immunity barriers. See infra text accom-
panying notes 202-12.
84. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
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Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the
judicial department of the government."85 However, "always
been deemed" was mostly invention. White's only citations to
support this claim related to the power to override a treaty;
none justified taking tribal property without compensation or
even a hearing on the merits, and he carefully ignored the
Court's opinion in the Cherokee railroad case.8 6
The opinion later stated that "the action of Congress now
complained of was . . . a mere change in the form of investment
of Indian tribal property, the property of those who, as we have
held, were in substantial effect the wards of the government." 87
This ignored the forced sale of much tribal land at a specified
price without determining whether it was the fair value
demanded by the Constitution. It also ignored the possibility
that allotment of arid, western Oklahoma land would seriously
devalue it. Its invocation of guardianship failed even to attempt
to determine whether the government had complied with a
guardian's legal duties. A later Court pointed out that the
government cannot hide an "act of confiscation" behind the
cloak of guardianship.88
Any doubt that the Lone Wolf Court had denied
constitutional protection to tribal land is dispelled by
comparing its decision to the Court's opinion nine years later in
Choate v. Trapp.89 Choate involved another episode in the
government's relentless allotment policy. To break up the tribal
holdings of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in what is now
85. Id. at 565.
86. Id. at 566. See also supra text accompanying notes 67-70. Denial of pro-
tection for tribal ownership had been hinted in Justice White's opinion for the
Court a month earlier in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08
(1902), but the focus of that case was on other issues.
87. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568. The mereness doctrine triumphed again. The
lower court opinion was similarly vacant. Lone Wolf, 19 App. D.C. at 329-32. For
criticism, see Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Call-
ing it a "Mere Change in the Form of Investment", 38 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2002).
88. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935). Ironically, this
opinion was authored by the government's lawyer in Lone Wolf. See infra text ac-
companying note 173. Among pre-Lone Wolf dicta on tribal ownership, the Lone
Wolf opinion recited the positive statement that tribal ownership is "as sacred as
the fee of the United States in the same lands," 187 U.S. at 564, and ignored Chief
Justice Taney's statement that tribes had no ownership rights. See supra note 61.
Perhaps Justice White did not want to revive the ghost of Dred Scott. After the
decision, the Indian Service followed through with allotment of the reservation.
See Act of Mar. 20, 1906, ch. 1125, 34 Stat. 80.
89. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
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eastern Oklahoma, the government negotiated the 1897 Atoka
Agreement providing for allotment and sale of "surplus" land
owned by the tribes. 90 Allotments were to be exempt from
taxation for up to twenty-one years, and the Agreement was
ratified by Congress in 1898.91 But in 1908, Congress
purported to repeal the tax exemption. 92 The lawsuit by some
eight thousand plaintiffs challenged the repeal, and the Court
sustained their claim. 93
The opinion's essential move was to interpret the tax
exemption as a property right protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 94 The decision granted injunctive relief, so the
Court's focus was again on the Due Process Clause rather than
on the Takings Clause. 95 The opinion expressly held that
individual Indians are protected by the Bill of Rights, 96 but it
cited Lone Wolf favorably. 97 The Court distinguished individual
from tribal property, implying that the latter lacked
constitutional protection: "there is a broad distinction between
tribal property and private property."98 It seems astonishing to
treat a tax exemption as a constitutionally protected property
right but to deny even minimal protection to the tribes'
beneficial fee.
Apropos of this article, the Choate Court supported its
decision by vigorously invoking the treaty canon of
interpretation that it had ignored in Lone Wolf.99 The issue
90. See id. at 668-69.
91. See id. at 667 (citing Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495,
507). The tax exemption was found in § 29 of the statute. Curtis Act of June 28,
1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 507.
92. See Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312, 313. The provision was ex-
plicit.
93. Choate, 224 U.S. 665.
94. See id. at 677-79.
95. See id.; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting that the
tribes' counsel in Lone Wolf used a parallel argumentative strategy).
96. Choate, 224 U.S. at 677-78. However, the year before Choate, the Court
held that an allottee's right to sell his land was not constitutionally protected and
could be removed by Congress's imposition of a twenty-year restriction on alien-
ation. Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911). In the same vein, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had called the tax exemption "a mere gratuity." Gleason v. Wood,
114 P. 703, 709 (Okla. 1911), rev'd per curiam, 224 U.S. 679 (1912). Gleason and
Choate were companion cases with the same issues. The Oklahoma court issued
its primary opinion in Gleason, and the Supreme Court its primary opinion in
Choate, so Choate was in substance a review of Gleason.
97. Choate, 224 U.S. at 671.
98. Id.
99. See id. The 1898 statute ratified an agreement with a tribe, so it was a
treaty equivalent. See id. at 668.
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returned in the Court's 1930 decision in Carpenter v. Shaw, 00
a reprise of Choate that involved the same Atoka allotments. A
1928 federal statute subjected oil and gas royalties from
restricted Indian allotments in eastern Oklahoma to state and
federal taxes. 101 The Court enjoined the state tax on reasoning
identical to Choate, including reliance on the treaty canon. 102
The Supreme Court's failure to accord constitutional
protection to tribal land allowed Congress's massively flawed
policy of forced allotment to proceed unchallenged. 103 However,
a decision recognizing tribal ownership in Lone Wolf would not
likely have undone much of the allotment juggernaut. As the
Lone Wolf tale illustrates, tribes wanted to keep their land, so
lawsuits had to be timely. Damages claims faced federal
sovereign immunity, which was then assumed to be a barrier
even to claims under the Takings Clause, and consent to be
sued in the Court of Claims excluded claims based on
treaties. 104 By the time Lone Wolf was decided, the statute of
limitations had run on most nineteenth century tribal
claims. 105 Congress has waived the statute and consented to
damages claims by tribes on a case-by-case basis, but consents
were usually subject to conditions that fell short of just
compensation. 106 Still another obstacle was the mistaken view
of many that tribes lacked corporate capacity to sue unless
specifically recognized by Congress.10 7
100. 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
101. See id. at 366 (citing Act of May 10, 1928, ch. 517, § 3, 45 Stat. 495, 496).
102. See id. at 365-68. The Carpenter Court also rejected Oklahoma's claim
that royalties were personalty and did not come within the Atoka tax exemption.
Id. at 365, 368-69. Apparently, the federal tax collector had respected the exemp-
tion, which by that time applied only to some of the allotments. See id. at 365. The
1908 statute involved in Choate and the 1928 statute involved in Carpenter could
have been read to exercise Congress's power of eminent domain, but the lawsuit
for injunctive relief did not seek compensation, and the Court did not mention this
possibility in either opinion.
103. For details of these laws' many defects, see Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling
Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1559, 1612-20 (2001); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
104. See Richard B. Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People Without Law, 5
INDIGENOUS L.J. 83, 112 (2006).
105. The statute of limitations for property claims against the government was
and remains six years. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006)).
106. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2], [6][b]; see also infra notes 213-18
and accompanying text.
107. Lone Wolf s counsel thought it was a barrier, so they sued in the names of
tribal leaders in a representative capacity. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
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Changing federal policy stopped further allotment and sale
of tribal common land.1 0 8 And in the 1930s, the Supreme Court
at last recognized tribal ownership against the feds. The
process began with Creek Nation v. United States, in which the
Court rejected immunity for federal actions with the remark
that the government cannot hide an "act of confiscation" behind
the cloak of guardianship. 109 The constitutional issue was
squarely resolved two years later when the Court held that
tribal land had been taken in violation of the Constitution,
requiring just compensation including prejudgment interest. 110
The next year, the Court rejected another stingy government
claim, holding that tribal ownership included the land's timber
and minerals.1 11 In 1987, the Court held the Takings Clause to
be self-executing, so that consents to sue for takings are no
553 (1903). The Lone Wolf Court said nothing about the question, and the Court
had readily allowed the Cherokee Nation to sue several times. Indeed, no Su-
preme Court opinion ever suggested agreement with the claim, and in Lane v.
Pueblo of Santa Rosa, the Court rejected the government's attempt to assert it.
249 U.S. 110, 112-14 (1919). However, Cohen's 1941 treatise stated it was a live
issue. 1941 COHEN, supra note 13, at 283-85. Events thereafter resolved the issue
conclusively in favor of tribal capacity. See Collins & Miller, supra note 104, at
112-17.
108. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.05 (describing the 1928 Meriam Report
and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act).
109. United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935). In Yankton
Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, the Court held that an 1894 agreement
had given the tribe fee title to a 648-acre tract that the government had seized
without compensation. 272 U.S. 351, 354-58 (1926). The Court held this to be an
exercise of eminent domain requiring just compensation. Id. However, the specific
reference to fee title made the decision distinguishable until the broader holdings
of the 1930s.
110. Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 498 (1937)
("Spoliation is not management."). In this and other decisions, courts interpreted
statutes passed as early as 1920 consenting to claims against the government that
silently allowed courts to find takings and award interest. See 299 U.S. at 497 and
cases cited. A few Indian claims judgments prior to 1937 had awarded prejudg-
ment interest based on agreement. See United States v. Cherokee Nation, 202
U.S. 101 (1906); United States v. Blackfeather, 155 U.S. 180 (1894); Pawnee Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 1, 15 (1920); Mille Lac Band of Chippewa
Indians v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 400, 407-08 (1916).
Ill. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); see also
United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) (sus-
taining judgment with interest for taking timber). A 1980 decision refined the
boundary between federal authority to manage tribal land as trustee and federal
liability for taking. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 416-21 (1980)
(affirming $100 million-plus judgment for taking the Black Hills). See generally
Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian
Land: An Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Newton 1982] (criticizing the distinction).
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longer needed. 112 Occurring long after Indian lands were taken,
this was yet another ruling too late to aid tribes. 113
Land under navigable water is a special category in both
general law and Indian law. As a result, Indian claims to own
submerged lands have generated mixed applications of the
treaty canon. The general federal rule is that states own
submerged land in trust for their people except to the extent
that the federal government transferred interests prior to
statehood. 114 There is a strong presumption against such
transfers, and they must have been made for a proper public
purpose. 115 Reserving land for Native Americans by treaty,
statute, or executive order can qualify as a lawful purpose, but
simply setting aside an Indian reservation is not, without
more, sufficient to reserve submerged land to tribal
ownership. 116 Tribes, usually with federal support, have gained
ownership when their economies depended on fishing the
disputed waters and under the special removal treaties
applicable to eastern Oklahoma.' 1 7 Otherwise, submerged land
within reservations belongs to the state.11 8 In other words, the
treaty canon has helped protect submerged lands of fishing
tribes and treaty lands in eastern Oklahoma, but it has failed
to avoid loss of submerged lands on other reservations.
Complex issues about tribal sovereignty after 1975 involve
both treaty and statutory canons. Application of the canons to
these disputes is discussed separately below.11 9
III. THE STATUTORY CANON
This section provides a detailed account of the statutory
canon. Its first part explains the canon's gradual emergence
from early in the twentieth century until it was clearly
established in the 1970s. It then reviews whether the canon
112. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
314-16 & n.9 (1987). See generally infra note 210.
113. First English mandates a damages remedy, but statutes of limitations are
nevertheless valid. See supra note 105.
114. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.05[3] [a].
115. See id. § 15.05[31 [a] (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49,
55 (1926); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842)).
116. See id. § 15.05[3][b].
117. E.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Choctaw Nation v. Ok-
lahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 789
(1918).
118. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.05[3][b].
119. See infra Part IV.B.
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has suitable support in legal theory. Emerging from dubious
paternalism, its modern support is usually said to depend on
the trust relationship between the United States and the
Indian nations. However, the scope of that theory is contested
and uncertain. The canon should have additional support in
democratic theory when Congress imposes laws on Indian
country because Indian votes have never been an important
political check on congressional power. Application of the canon
to general federal laws, however, is more complex and should
depend on context.
This section's second part discusses the statutory canon's
major applications to disputes between Native Americans and
state and private interests. It concludes that, like the treaty
canon, the statutory canon has helped to protect Indian
resources and sovereignty. It also identifies the canon's
unlikely creator, Justice Willis Van Devanter. The third part
addresses the canon's application to disputes between Indians
and the federal government. This involves complex issues
about federal sovereign immunity that have been major
barriers to justice for tribes.
A. Origin and Theory
Congress ended new Indian treaties in 1871, but the
government continued to make formal agreements with Indian
nations that were ratified by the full Congress rather than by
two-thirds of the Senate. 120 These statutes are essentially
treaty equivalents that should be subject to the treaty canon.12 1
The first Supreme Court opinion to suggest a rule for other
federal statutes was little more than an aside in a context that
likely disadvantaged the Indian party to the case. 122 In United
States v. Celestine, the Court sustained federal jurisdiction to
prosecute an Indian for murder on a reservation against
counsel's argument that his citizenship implicitly divested
federal authority. The Court stated:
120. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.03[9] (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch.
120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006))).
121. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675-77 (1912); Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); 1941 COHEN, supra note 13, at 37 n.45 (citing
Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 64 (1928); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-
67 (1980)). For recent agreements, tribal parties are versed in English and repre-
sented by lawyers, so a different set of rules may be appropriate. However, most
contested agreements long predated these changes.
122. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909).
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Bearing in mind the rule that the legislation of Congress is
to be construed in the interest of the Indian, . . . it cannot be
said to be clear that Congress intended by the mere grant of
citizenship to renounce entirely its jurisdiction over the
individual members of this dependent race. 123
The first major decision clearly stating that ambiguous
Indian statutes, other than those ratifying agreements, should
be interpreted in Indians' favor upheld fishing rights of a small
tribe in Alaska.124 The next use was in an obscure and
technical decision. 125 The second major decision was made soon
after publication of Cohen's 1941 treatise, and Cohen
participated in its briefing. 126 Thereafter, decisions invoking
the statutory rule gradually increased until it became an
established canon of interpretation. 127
The theoretical justification for the treaty rule will not
work for statutes that are not treaty equivalents. The treaty
123. Id. at 290-91. The statement may have meant that the interpretation was
favorable to Indians generally (and to the class represented by defendant's victim)
if not to the defendant. No authority for "the rule" was cited, but the opinion's au-
thor was Justice Brewer, who had applied the treaty canon to a statute ratifying
an agreement with a tribe in the landmark decision in Winters v. United States,
207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). See supra text accompanying notes 51-52 (discuss-
ing the decision).
124. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1918). The
opinion cited Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), "and cases cited." Choate in-
terpreted a statute ratifying an agreement, that is, a treaty equivalent; its "cases
cited" involved interpretation of treaties rather than statutes. For further discus-
sion of Alaska Pac. Fisheries, see infra text accompanying notes 164-70.
125. See United States v. Reily, 290 U.S. 33, 39 (1933) (holding that under a
special allotment statute, heir's title retained restriction on alienation). A few
other opinions said or implied that Congress should not be found to have intended
repeal of treaty rights absent clear intent. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S.
432, 442-43 (1903); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 395-96 (1902); Choc-
taw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1886); Leavenworth, Lawrence &
Galveston R.R. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 741-44 (1876). However, in all
but the Choctaw case, the Court sustained a position advocated by the govern-
ment. For a dissent similar to Choctaw, see The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616,
622-24 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
126. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353-55 (1941); see
also infra text accompanying notes 183-87. On Cohen's participation, see Santa
Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 341; Felix S. Cohen, Bibliography of Felix S. Cohen,
9 RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 353 (1954). For details on the case, see generally
CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUAIAPAI LAND CASE AND
THE BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY (2007). Briefs for Indians asserted a statutory rule
in other pre-1941 cases. See, e.g., Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299
U.S. 476, 480 (1937).
127. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.02[1]-[2]; infra text accompanying
notes 188-201 (discussing Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Menominee
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); and other leading cases).
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rule's search for expectations that were the basis for Indian
consent to a treaty and for evidence of how Indian parties
understood treaty terms cannot support a statute enacted
without Indian consent. From the beginning, the government
has had a loose policy of consultation with tribes, which waxed
and waned with policy shifts. 128 But in the end, the statutes
were what Congress favored, whether or not any or some or
many tribes agreed.
1. Paternalism
Theories to justify the statutory rule are either suggested
by the Court's opinions or asserted by scholars. The oldest is
paternalism, based on the frequent statement in judicial
opinions prior to the 1960s that the policy of the United States
toward weak and defenseless Native Americans is one of
benevolence. Among other problems, these statements often
appeared in opinions justifying oppressive laws, most
notoriously Lone Wolf's denial of tribal ownership and its green
light for forced allotment.129 One cannot match these
encomiums to any consistent policy of judicial respect for
Indian rights. The statements appear in decisions of every sort.
2. The Federal Trust Relationship
The most frequent theory in modern discourse is based on
the trust relationship between Indian nations and the United
States: Because of the federal trust obligation, ambiguous
federal statutes should be interpreted in favor of Indian rights
to property and sovereignty. The trust relationship is cited in
judicial opinions and is the dominant theory in scholarly works
including the 1982 and 2005 editions of the Cohen treatise. 130
The trust concept regarding Indian land has been said to
derive from the 1763 Royal Proclamation that placed land
"under the dominion and protection" of the Crown "for the use
of the . . . Indians."'31 However, the trust relationship is more
commonly traced to Chief Justice Marshall's remark in
128. See Kevin K. Washburn, Felix Cohen, Anti-Semitism and American In-
dian Law, 33 AM. IND. L. REV. 583, 587-91 (2008).
129. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
130. See, e.g., Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985);
2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.02[2]; 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 221-25.
131. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.03.
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Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that Indians' "relation to the
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."1 32
This dictum evolved from Marshall's analogy to a formal
guardianship policy and into the allotment laws' land title
terms, by which the United States owns allotments in trust for
Indian beneficiaries. 133 For a century after Cherokee Nation,
federal guardianship was repeatedly cited to justify policies
adopted by the political branches, both those favoring and
harming Indian interests. 134 When Indians opposed a federal
policy, courts invoked the guardianship concept against them
rather than in their favor. 135
From the 1930s, the term trust relationship gradually
replaced guardianship in legal discourse, and decisions
invoking the statutory canon have cited the trust relationship
as support for it.136 Some discussions of the trust relationship
assert special solicitude for Indian treaty rights.'3 7 This
supports the trust concept indirectly. Political decisions
extended the Worcester treaty interpretation in favor of
I retained tribal sovereignty into federal policy for all Indian
country, including reservations set aside by statute, executive
order, or Spanish law. 138 As Cohen said in 1941, "The
reciprocal obligations assumed by the [flederal [g]overnment
and by the Indian tribes during a period of almost a hundred
years constitute a chief source of present day Indian law."1 39
This made Worcester's sovereignty doctrine the "backdrop" for
sovereignty issues generally. 140
However, the Court has at times defined the trust
relationship as whatever Congress says it is.141 A number of
132. 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
133. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.04[4] [a]; see generally 2005 COHEN, sU-
pra note 1, § 16.03[2][b] (discussing the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat.
388 (1887) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-333) and subsequent amend-
ments thereto).
134. See, e.g., Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 677 (1912) (favoring); Lone Wolf,
187 U.S. at 566 (harming).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); Lone Wolf, 187 U.S.
at 565.
136. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.04[4][a].
137. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of
Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975).
138. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
139. 1941 COHEN, supra note 13, at 33.
140. See McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
141. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 127-28 (1983) (statutory
duty to reclamation project overrode trust duty to tribe); United States v.
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modern statutes expressly embrace the trust relationship and
thus provide another background principle for the statutory
canon. 142 But some Court decisions interpreting statutes
passed during the allotment era pointed out that federal policy
at that time was not favorable to tribal interests and read the
statutes accordingly. 143 Notably, the Court has interpreted
ambiguous allotment statutes that opened tribal reservations
to white settlement to have implicitly eliminated reservation
status of the opened area. 144
3. The Democratic Deficit
Another theoretical concept should provide additional
support for the statutory canon. When Congress imposes laws
on Indian country, it lacks any semblance of political restraint.
A member who votes against Indian interests will not risk
losing the next election and may gain support from powerful
interests opposing Indians.145 Marshall's guardianship analogy
and its successors alluded to this point: a guardian or trustee
has such great control over a ward's or beneficiary's property
that courts must impose strict standards of honesty and fair
dealing.146
This democratic deficit is a strong reason for courts to
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 541-46 (1980) (allotment trust imposed no management
duties); see also 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.05[4][a]-[b] (detailing conflicts of
interest within federal departments). Justice Thomas said the right analogy is
guardianship rather than trust, which carries lesser duties. United States v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 483 n.1 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing).
142. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.04[4] [a] (gathering statutes).
143. See, e.g., Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1992).
144. See infra Part IV.A (discussing South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522
U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975)).
145. In the nation's earliest days, its Indian population was relatively numer-
ous, but Indians were not citizens and could not vote. When Indians became citi-
zens, they had become a small minority, and state voting laws kept many from
voting until modern times. See generally 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 14.01[1]-
[4]; 14.02[1], [2][b]. Some points in this section were raised in Richard B. Collins,
Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 378-81 (1989). A
more recent analysis is found in Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 45 (2012).
146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 77-79, 86-87 (2003); GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed., rev. 1984). On Marshall's analogy, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 132-33.
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insist that Congress spell out legislative impairments of Indian
rights. Ambiguous laws will not do. Whether this concern has
directly influenced any court decision is uncertain. No judicial
opinion has been found that recognizes it more exactly than the
analogy identified above. The Court's adoption of the statutory
canon may imply recognition; its demeaning references to
Indians as weak and defenseless were at least an accurate
description of their lack of direct political influence in
Congress.
Recent events have softened the democratic deficit. Though
tribes lack the votes to influence Congress directly, they have
acquired greater public support and the ability to lobby
Congress. 147 However, during most of our history, Congress
acted with virtually no Indian influence and often in response
to Indians' powerful enemies. 148 Thus, when courts interpret
statutes adopted under those conditions, the democratic deficit
ought to support a strong statutory canon.
This reasoning encounters more complex applications
when we shift our attention from statutes governing Indian
country to general federal laws applicable to everyone. These
laws are tempered by normal political restraints. When
Indians' interests are similar to those of other citizens, there
should be no occasion for a statutory canon. 149 When general
federal statutes impose on governments, tribal sovereignty is
affected. At times tribes' interests may align with those of state
and local governments, which have serious political clout. 150
147. See, e.g., Report on National Congress of American Indians, INFLUENCE
EXPLORER, http://influenceexplorer.com/organization/national-congress-of-america
n-Indians/b8e898903c5O47db872e5f2Oacc5f5ca?cycle=-1 (last visited Mar. 5,
2012). Tribal interests even became tangled with the scandals involving Jack
Abramoff and were accordingly the subject of a congressional inquiry and report.
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., "GIMME FIVE"-
INVESTIGATION OF TRIBAL LOBBYING MATTERS (Comm. Print June 22, 2006),
available at http://www
.indian.senate.gov/public/_-files/Report.pdf. Improved public support is shown by
President Nixon's 1970 Special Message on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564
(1970), and by the positive recognition of the trust relationship in both major par-
ties' presidential-year platforms since 1976, see Political Party Platforms, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulplatforms.
php (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
148. For discussion and analysis of manifold instances, see 2005 COHEN, supra
note 1, § 1.03[4] [a] (Indian Removal Act); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371, 382-84 (1980) (Black Hills taking).
149. Reported decisions are in accord, though not on this explicit basis. See
2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.03 ("Individual Indians and their property are pre-
sumed subject to the same general federal laws as all other persons.").
150. For example, federal law governs the status of noncitizens wherever
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More often, however, tribal sovereignty raises distinct
concerns. Tribal property has important cultural value. 151
Tribes and states are often in direct conflict over authority to
govern Indian country.152 These are important occasions to
apply the statutory canon. 153 Other laws that apply to everyone
can have uniquely negative impacts on Indian interests. A
notable example is the Eagle Protection Act, which forbids
killing eagles and possession of eagle parts.154 Another is the
statutory protection for religious freedom1 55 applied to Indian
claims to protect sacred sites on public lands. The statutory
canon is justly applied to them, but results are mostly
negative. 156
The Supreme Court has so far addressed cases involving
Indian challenges to general federal laws by saying that the
issue in every case is whether Congress intended application of
the contested statute to Indian country. 157 Because Congress
often fails to consider the issue, we are left with the usual
game of attributed intent. This yields some useful points, such
as judging whether a statute would be rendered ineffective by
an Indian country exception. 158 Some courts have thought it
relevant whether a tribal activity is traditionally governmental
found. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
151. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.01.
152. See generally id. §§ 6.01[5], 6.02[1]-[2][b], 6.03[1][a]-[2][c], 6.04[3][b][i]-
[iv], 11.01[1]-[2], 11.02[1]-[3], 11.03, 11.04[1]-[5], 11.05[1]-[4], 11.06, 11.07,
11.08.
153. See generally 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 2.03, 21.02[5][c][ij-[6]; Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian
Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (1991).
154. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2006). On the importance of the Eagle Protection
Act to Native Americans, see United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); 2005
COHEN, supra note 1, § 14.03[2][c][ii][C]. The Dion Court applied the statutory
canon but found clear congressional intent to override a treaty right. 476 U.S. at
738-45.
155. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(4) (2006).
156. See, e.g., Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1281 (2009); S. Fork Band v. U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 643 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2009), aff'd per curiam, 588 F.3d 718 (9th
Cir. 2009); Comanche Nation v. United States, No. 08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621
(W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008). Only the Comanche Nation claim was successful.
None of the opinions recited the canon.
157. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 118
(1960). Most decisions on this issue are in the lower federal courts, but they ob-
serve a like rule. For more information, see cases cited in 2005 COHEN, supra note
1, §§ 2.03, 10.01[2][a]-[c], 21.02[5][c][i]-[ii], 21.02[6].
158. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 811-13 (1976).
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or private, opining that private tribal activity should not merit
an Indian exception.159 This fits analysis based on political
restraint because laws imposed on the private sector impact
more voters. 160 However, when federal laws exempt enterprises
owned by state and local government, tribes should have like
treatment. 161
Whether and when to rely on political restraint is a
frequent subject of judicial review that sharply divides the
Supreme Court on such basic issues as state sovereignty,
voting rights, personal autonomy, interstate commerce, and
rights of corporations. 162 In Indian law to date, the only explicit
reliance on the concept of democracy has deployed the concept
against tribal sovereignty, as explained below. 163 A more
balanced approach is in order.
B. Application to Disputes with State or Private Parties
Like the treaty canon, the statutory rule has been more ef-
fective for tribes when the opposing interest is a state or
private party. The rule's inaugural decision, Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. United States,164 is illustrative and remarkable for
several reasons. In 1887, the small Metlakatla band migrated
from British Columbia to Alaska. 165 In 1891, Congress by
statute set aside Annette Islands as a reserve for the tribe.166
159. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 2.03 (describing the cases).
160. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (in state sover-
eignty dispute, distinguishing laws imposed only on state governments from "gen-
erally applicable laws" imposed on states in common with private sector).
161. See Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-Owned Businesses Are Not "Employ-
ers": Economic Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San Manuel Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (2006) (criticizing application of National La-
bor Relations Act to tribal business when it does not apply to state and local
businesses). On labor and employment laws, see Wenona T. Singel, The Institu-
tional Economics of Tribal Labor Relations, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 487; Vicki J.
Limas, The Tuscarorganization of the Tribal Workforce, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV.
467; Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, De Facto Judicial Preemption of Tribal Labor and
Employment Law, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 435; Vicki J. Limas, Application of Fed-
eral Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: Respecting Sov-
ereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1994).
162. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
163. See infra Part IV.C.
164. 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
165. Id. at 86.
166. Id. at 86-87 (citing Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, sec. 15, 26 Stat. 1094,
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In 1916, the Alaska Pacific Fisheries Company installed a
"formidable" fish-trap in waters off the islands.167 The
government successfully sued to enjoin maintenance of the
trap. 168 The Court held that the 1891 statutory reservation
included adjacent waters and submerged land despite the
strong rule that land under navigable waters of federal
territories is held by the United States in trust for future states
and may be conveyed before statehood only on the clearest
showing of intent. 169 Thus, the decision giving birth to the
statutory canon was in favor of an immigrant tribe with no
treaty rights, and the decision overcame a strong, contrary rule
of interpretation.
Another notable feature of the Alaska Pacific opinion was
its author, Justice Willis Van Devanter. Constitutional scholars
know him as one of the conservative justices who voted to
strike down New Deal legislation in the 1930s and federal child
labor laws a generation earlier. 170 He was also the one justice
in the Court's history with significant personal experience in
American Indian law. His work in the field began when he
represented his home state of Wyoming to win a notorious
decision denying Indian hunting and fishing rights.171 The
same year, he moved to Washington and became an assistant
attorney general in the Interior Department.172 Over the next
several years, he argued several Indian law cases to the courts,
opposing suits by tribes against the government-including
Lone Wolf-and supporting tribal rights when the government
sued to enforce them. 173 Appointed to the Eighth Circuit in
1903, he did not sit for any major Indian law cases but heard
1101).
167. Id. at 87.
168. Id. at 86.
169. Id. at 87-90; see also supra text accompanying notes 114-18. Despite the
novelty of the Court's decision, it was unanimous.
170. See Willis Van Devanter, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWillisV
anDevanter (last visited June 6, 2012).
171. See Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 507 (1896). This was one of the few
hunting and fishing decisions that Indians have lost. See supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
172. See Willis Van Devanter, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWillisV
anDevanter (last visited June 6, 2012).
173. See United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 434 (1903); Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 563 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294,
299 (1902); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 382 (1902). He also represented
the government in Indian law cases before the D.C. courts. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel.
West, v. Hitchcock, 19 App. D.C. 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1902).
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many appeals from the Indian Territory.174 On the Supreme
Court from 1911, he became the Court's Indian law specialist,
writing its notable opinions favorable to Indian interests in
Alaska Pacific Fisheries, United States v. Sandoval,175 United
States v. Quiver,176 Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 177 Seufert
Bros. Co. v. United States,178 United States v. Candelaria,179
United States v. Chavez, 80 and Creek Nation v. United
States,181 as well as in forty-four routine Indian law cases.1 82
Justice Van Devanter's involvement in the Lone Wolf case was
atoned by a strong judicial record respectful of Indian rights.
174. See, e.g., Stanclift v. Fox, 152 F. 697, 698 (8th Cir. 1907). Van Devanter
did write the opinion in one Indian law case of note, Rainbow v. Young, 161 F.
835, 835 (8th Cir. 1908), which sustained the authority of Indian police on the
Winnebago Reservation in Nebraska.
175. 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (holding Pueblo land is Indian country protected by
federal laws defining crimes against Indians).
176. 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (denying federal authority to prosecute tribal Indians
for adultery in Indian country).
177. 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (sustaining injunction against Interior Secretary to
prevent wrongful disposal of tribal land).
178. 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (protecting Yakima treaty fishing rights).
179. 271 U.S. 432 (1926) (sustaining authority of U.S. to protect Pueblo land
ownership).
180. 290 U.S. 357 (1933) (Pueblo land is Indian country protected by federal
laws against theft of Indian livestock).
181. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
182. Chippewa Indians of Minn. v. United States, 301 U.S. 358 (1937); British-
American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936); Stewart
v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403 (1935); United States v. Reily, 290 U.S. 33, 39 (1933) (rely-
ing on statutory canon); Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753 (1931); Mott v.
United States, 283 U.S. 747 (1931); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281
U.S. 206 (1930); Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431 (1928); Longest v. Langford, 276
U.S. 69 (1928); Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58, 64 (1928) (relying on treaty can-
on); Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456 (1926); United States v. Minnesota, 270
U.S. 181 (1926); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472 (1924);
Bunch v. Cole, 263 U.S. 250 (1923); United States v. Bowling, 256 U.S. 484 (1921);
Privett v. United States, 256 U.S. 201 (1921); La Motte v. United States, 254 U.S.
570 (1921); Harris v. Bell, 254 U.S. 103 (1920); Broadwell v. Bd., 253 U.S. 25
(1920); Ward v. Bd., 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235 (1919);
Parker v. Riley, 250 U.S. 66 (1919); Kenny v. Miles, 250 U.S. 58 (1919); Jefferson
v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288 (1918); United States v. Ferguson, 247 U.S. 175 (1918);
United States v. Chase, 245 U.S. 89 (1917); United States v. Rowell, 243 U.S. 464
(1917); Williams v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 434 (1917); Dickson v. Luck Land
Co., 242 U.S. 371 (1917); Hill v. Reynolds, 242 U.S. 361 (1917); United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916); La Roque v. United States, 239 U.S. 62 (1915);
Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441 (1914); Washington v. Miller, 235 U.S. 422
(1914); Adkins v. Arnold, 235 U.S. 417 (1914); Skelton v. Dill, 235 U.S. 206 (1914);
United States v. Bartlett, 235 U.S. 72 (1914); Pronovost v. United States, 232 U.S.
487 (1914); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914); Thurston v. United
States, 232 U.S. 469 (1914); Monson v. Simonson, 231 U.S. 341 (1913); United
States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 229 U.S. 498 (1913); Kindred v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582 (1912); Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912).
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The Court's second major decision to recite a statutory
canon of interpretation was United States v. Santa Fe Pacific
Railroad Company in 1941.183 The rule again appeared to
make a difference. The United States sued a railroad to enforce
the Walapai Tribe's original Indian title. 184 The railroad
claimed that several federal statutes had extinguished that
title by implication. 185 The Court rejected each extinguishment
claim for lack of clear intent, citing the treaty-equivalent rule
of Choate v. Trapp:186
We search the public records in vain for any clear and plain
indication that Congress . . . intended to extinguish all of
the rights which the Walapais had in their ancestral home
.... Nor was there any plain intent or agreement on the
part of the Walapais to abandon their ancestral lands ....
No forfeiture can be predicated on an unauthorized attempt
to effect a forcible settlement . . . unless we are to be
insensitive to the high standards for fair dealing in light of
which laws dealing with Indian rights have long been
read. 187
In the 1950s and 1960s, the government adopted and
pursued a mindless policy to terminate the distinct legal status
of Indian nations and end trust protection for tribal land.
Indian opposition generated two of the most notable
applications of the statutory canon.188 In Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, the Court held that the statute
terminating the Menominees' federal status had not abolished
their freedom to hunt and fish on their former reservation
without complying with state regulations.189 The opinion relied
on the treaty canon to infer that hunting and fishing rights
were implicitly guaranteed by the treaty and on the statutory
canon to hold that Congress had not abolished those rights.190
183. 314 U.S. 339, 353-55 (1941).
184. Id. at 343.
185. Id. at 348-54.
186. Id. at 354. Walapai is now customarily spelled Hualapai. See THE
HUALAPAI TRIBE WEBSITE, http://hualapai-nsn.gov/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
On original Indian title, see infra text accompanying notes 233-58.
187. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. at 353-56.
188. On the termination policy generally, see 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §
1.06.
189. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
190. Id. at 405-06, 412-13. Dissenters agreed on the treaty right but thought
that the statute had abolished it. Id. at 415 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The statute
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The second occasion in which the Court applied the
statutory canon to a termination policy was a 1976 decision
interpreting the scope of a 1953 statute giving state courts civil
and criminal jurisdiction over reservations in many states. 191 A
Minnesota county relied on the statute to impose its personal
property tax on an Indian resident of the Leech Lake
Reservation.192 The relevant text applied to reservation
Indians "those civil laws of such State that are of general
application to private persons or private property" except for
laws relating to Indian trust property. 193 The plaintiffs mobile
home was not trust property, so the statute appeared to apply
state tax law, and the state courts so held.194 The Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, relying strongly on the statutory
canon. 195
The Court invoked the canon in a 1978 decision that
protected tribal sovereignty from federal court review of
individual rights claims: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.196 A
1968 statute imposed most provisions of the Bill of Rights and
the Equal Protection Clause on tribal governments.1 97 The
statute expressly authorized federal district courts to review
tribal detentions by habeas corpus but was otherwise silent
about enforcement. 198 The Santa Clara Pueblo passed and
enforced a law on membership of children of mixed marriages
under which offspring of Santa Clara men are members, while
those of women are not. 199 In a suit to overturn the law as a
denial of equal protection, the Supreme Court held that a civil
cause of action to enforce the 1968 federal statute should not be
is plain on its face .... .").
191. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
192. Id. at 378.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). The statute also expressly authorizes concurrent
tribal authority where it is not inconsistent with state law. Id. § 1360(c).
194. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. at 375.
195. Id. at 392.
196. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
197. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006) (Indian Civil Rights Act). Congress passed
the law in part because in 1896 the Court had held that tribes were not subject to
the Bill of Rights directly. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). Talton is often
hailed as an affirmation of tribal sovereignty, which in outcome it was. See, e.g.,
2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 4.01[1] [a]. However, the opinion was murky. It relied
on the former view that the Bill of Rights did not apply to states, either. Talton,
163 U.S. at 382. The rights claim at issue was indictment by grand jury, and the
Court cited its decisions, still good law today, refusing to impose that right on
states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 384-85. And the Court stressed
that Congress could impose laws on tribes. Id. at 384.
198. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
199. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51.
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implied. 200 The opinion strongly relied on the statutory
canon.201
C. Application to Disputes with the Federal Government
When tribes have sought judicial remedies against the
federal government, sovereign immunity has been a dominant
barrier to justice, and the statutory canon has seldom aided
their claims. The first section of this part points out that
sovereign immunity has defeated any claims for return of land
in kind. While sovereign immunity is no barrier to injunctive
relief against future wrongdoing by officials, such claims must
be timely filed. Therefore, the only remedy for historical
wrongs is damages claims, but these require either finding an
unconstitutional taking or clear statutory consent to suit.
The second section of this part discusses the most
important category of damages claims: those seeking redress
for land wrongfully taken. Statutory consents to damages
claims present challenging issues of interpretation, and
decisions have often been hyper-technical and stingy. The
section relates the long history of consent statutes including an
account of the Indian Claims Commission.
The third section addresses the particular subject of the
Court's failure to accord constitutional protection to original
Indian title. The fourth briefly describes the status of executive
order Indian reservations. The fifth section is a discussion of
breach of trust claims for wrongs other than taking of land.
Here again, interpretation of statutes consenting to damages
remedies has been overly strict.
1. Remedy
Because of federal sovereign immunity, it is crucial to
analyze remedies when reviewing Indians' disputes with the
federal government. Tribes above all wanted to keep their land,
but federal law had no judicial remedy to recover land
200. Id.
201. Id. at 60. As the dissent noted, the Court had readily implied a private
civil cause of action to enforce previous civil rights laws. Id. at 73-74 (White, J.,
dissenting). In 2012 Santa Clara's membership voted to modify or repeal the re-
striction. See Tom Sharpe, Santa Clara Vote on New Member Rules Leaves Loose
Ends, THE NEW MEXICAN, May 1, 2012, available at http://www.santafenewmexic
an.com/localnews/Pueblo-vote-on-member-rules-leaves-loose-ends.
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wrongfully taken until recently. 202 Tribal land has often been
restored by political action that set aside or expanded
reservations by statute or executive order.203 The 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act provided for return of unsold land ceded
under allotment statutes and authorized the Interior
Department to take other land in trust "for the purpose of
providing land for Indians."204 Under secretarial regulations,
unrestricted land within or adjacent to existing reservations is
readily taken into trust, but the process is more difficult for
land elsewhere. 205 Moreover, the Supreme Court restricted the
statute to tribes recognized by Interior in 1934; the statutory
canon was defeated by misapplication of the plain meaning
rule, as the dissenters showed. 206
In recent years, tribes have had occasional success in suits
seeking an injunction or declaratory judgment against federal
officials alleged to have breached federal trust obligations to
tribes or otherwise to have acted illegally, and the statutory
canon has played a role in some of these decisions. 207 However,
equitable remedies are for future conduct, 208 while tribes often
need remedies for past wrongs. When tribal property is
202. See Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409A (2006). The statute expressly does
not apply to Indian trust lands. Id. § 2409A(a). It includes a limitations period of
twelve years. Id. § 2409A(g).
203. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.04[3][b]-[4]; Act of Sept. 4, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-340, 94 Stat. 1072 (expanding land base of Siletz Tribe); Act of Aug. 4,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-337, 92 Stat. 455 (expanding Fallon Indian Reservation); Act
of Sept. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-427, 86 Stat. 719 (expanding Warm Springs Res-
ervation); Act of Dec. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (restoring Taos
Pueblo ownership of sacred Blue Lake); see also Nell Jessup Newton, Compensa-
tion, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28
GA. L. REV. 453, 476-77 (1994) [hereinafter Newton 1994].
204. 25 U.S.C. §§ 463, 465 (2006). Laws specific to named tribes have similar
provisions. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.07[1][a]. The 1983 Indian Land
Consolidation Act promotes elimination of fractionated titles caused by the allot-
ment laws. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2209 (2006); see also 2005 COHEN, supra note 1,
§ 15.07[2].
205. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 151 (2011); 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.07[l][b].
Constitutional attacks on the statute by Indians' opponents have caused the crite-
ria to be scrutinized and refined. See id. § 15.07[1][c].
206. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (applying 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006)).
The Court majority pronounced the statute unambiguous, but the dissent and
lower courts did not agree. For criticism of Carcieri, see Scott A. Taylor, Indian
Law: Taxation in Indian Country After Carcieri v. Salazar, 36 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 590 (2010). For criticism of "plain meaning," see Michael R. Merz, Meaning-
lessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 31 (1979).
207. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.05[1][a]. Of course, Lone Wolf was a
failed attempt to enjoin loss of land. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 83.
208. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-68 (1974).
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mismanaged by federal overseers, the wrong will often be
unknown until after the fact because officials control the
relevant records, often located far from Indian country.
For these reasons, most judicial contests between tribes
and the federal government have involved damages claims, and
all damages claims against the government depend on waivers
of sovereign immunity. 209 In 1987, the Supreme Court held the
Takings Clause to be a constitutional waiver; 210 but other
claims depend on contracts or statutes that waive immunity.211
The Supreme Court has often said that statutory waivers are
strictly construed in favor of the government, though an
irregular trend has generated some play in the rule's
applications. 212 As relevant here, when the statutory Indian
law canon clashed with the sovereign immunity rule, sovereign
immunity usually, but not always, prevailed.
2. Damages for Land
An 1863 federal statute (known by its 1887 amended form
as the Tucker Act) consented to damages claims against the
government based on property or contract, but the statute
unambiguously excluded claims based on treaties. 213 For this
reason, Indian treaty claims required a special act of Congress
for each tribe, consenting to suit, defining the cause of action,
and waiving the statute of limitations. 214 The process was
plagued by delay. 215 Many waivers were strictly construed
against tribes: narrow causes of action, stingy damages rules,
209. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
210. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 311-16 (1987). As it often does, the Court claimed that this had always
been the law, or at least had been clear since its decision in Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). However, Professor Sisk explained that Jacobs had
simply acknowledged the Tucker Act's statutory consent to constitutional claims,
which the Court had previously restricted to cases in which the government
sought title to land. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sover-
eign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 568-71 (2008). It is
reasonable to suppose that Jacobs' recognition of Tucker Act jurisdiction based on
inverse condemnation owed something to the Court's first recognition of the con-
cept in the celebrated decision of Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
211. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400; see generally Sisk, supra note 210, at 525-33.
212. See Sisk, supra note 210, at 543-606.
213. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 384 n.15 (1980).
214. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4]-[5].
215. See H. D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION 19-20 (1990) (reporting an average of 15 years from enact-
ment of consent to final judgment).
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and substantial offsets for federal aid.2 16 As a result, most
claims were unsuccessful. 217 The Court of Claims could hear
nontreaty claims, but many lawyers believed that all tribal
claims were barred, 218 and most nontreaty claims would have
needed waiver of the statute of limitations in any event.
That scheme was fundamentally changed by the 1946
Indian Claims Commission Act ("ICCA"). 219 This act consented
to all historical Indian claims being heard by a new Indian
Claims Commission and reviewed by the Court of Claims. 220
The statute was generous in its definition of causes of action,
encompassing a broad range of land claims and a provision to
allow recovery for other wrongs.221 However, the Commission
and Court of Claims narrowed the latter substantially. 222
Furthermore, while ICCA waived immunity and limitations, it
allowed other defenses and offsets. 223 ICCA also consented to
future Indian treaty claims by removing the treaty exclusion
from the Tucker Act, subject to the Act's six-year statute of
limitations. 224
The statute implied, but did not specify, that only damages
could be awarded. In any case, the Commission and courts
assumed as much from the outset.225 Congress punted on other
216. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2]; ROSENTHAL, supra note 215, at
20-21, 27-33; Glen A. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Claims Before the Court of
Claims, 55 GEO. L.J. 511, 517-18 (1966).
217. See Wilkinson, supra note 216, at 513.
218. See Collins & Miller, supra note 104, at 102-12.
219. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 139, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70n-2). The act's history is related at John T. Vance, The Con-
gressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission, 45 N.D. L. REV. 325,
326-32 (1969).
220. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, ch. 139, 60 Stat. 1049 (formerly codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70n-2).
221. Id. § 2, 60 Stat. 1050. Nonland claims came under § 2(5): "claims based
upon fair and honorable dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of
law or equity."
222. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3]; Nell Jessup Newton, Indian
Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753, 776-84 (1992) [here-
inafter Newton 1992]. The most common nonland claim allowed was accounting
for mismanagement of tribal funds. Many accounting claims were heard, but
proofs were difficult. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 215, at 137, 139-40.
223. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3].
224. ICCA § 24, 60 Stat. 1055 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006));
see also 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[5].
225. The implication arose from the Claims Commission name, review by the
Court of Claims, and references in section 2 of the statute to deductions, offsets,
and quantum of relief, and to the words "amount" and "sums" in §§ 15, 19, &
22(a), 60 Stat. 1050, 1053-55. When claimants sought awards of land in kind,
their claims were rejected. E.g., Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 97 F.
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issues of remedy, notably the major question of prejudgment
interest.226 In due course, decisions said that Fifth Amendment
takings must include prejudgment interest. 227 However, the
Commission and Court of Claims found numerous ways to
avoid finding a taking.228 The most egregious were refusing to
recognize coerced or fraudulent treaties as takings and
allowing the government to prevail on its claim that it acted as
good faith manager of tribal assets when the facts belied the
claim. 229 On the other hand, a few claims for interest based on
agreements rather than takings succeeded, aided by the treaty
canon. 230 And fair market value was the measure for land
taken, rejecting the government's attempts to assert a lesser
standard. 23 1
An important and ironic defense was res judicata based on
prior claims judgments. In two cases, the defense barred claims
based on past judgments in special consent cases that were
held-in effect, retroactively-to have found constitutional
takings, though no takings claim had been made and no
interest awarded.232
Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951). The statute's provisions
on evidence, lawyers, and offsets implied some sort of adversarial procedure, but
it has been criticized as overly adversarial by its last chair and by scholars. See
Newton 1992, supra note 222, at 772; Vance, supra note 219, at 332-36
226. The statute's silence was not simply an oversight. Congress had consid-
ered but failed to pass statutes limiting prejudgment interest to six years. See
ROSENTHAL, supra note 215, at 27-28; Howard M. Friedman, Interest on Indian
Claims. Judicial Protection of the Fisc, 5VAL. U. L. REV. 26, 28 (1970).
227. See Friedman, supra note 226, at 41.
228. See id. at 30-37. An experienced claims lawyer reported that as of 1966,
only two ICCA takings claims for interest had succeeded. See Wilkinson, supra
note 216, at 526.
229. Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686
(Ct. C1.1968); see also Friedman, supra note 226, at 34-37. The Supreme Court
embraced the "good faith" theory of Fort Berthold in United States v. Sioux Na-
tion, 448 U.S. 371, 416-21 (1980). For additional criticism, see Newton 1982, su-
pra note 111.
230. E.g., Peoria Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 390 U.S. 468, 472-
73 (1968); Nez Perce Tribe v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 815, 829 (Ct. Cl. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 984 (1967) (partial recovery); Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 67 F. Supp. 972, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1946).
231. See, e.g., Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 389 F.2d
778, 781-84 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
232. Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 906 (Ct. Cl. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 863 (1954); Blackfeet & Gros Ventre Tribes of Indians v.
United States, 119 F. Supp. 161 (Ct. Cl. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954).
Failure to claim interest in the prior cases was, in hindsight, malpractice but un-
derstandable because of the widespread opinion that it was not recoverable until
the Supreme Court decisions in 1935 and 1937. See supra text accompanying
notes 109-11. On res judicata in the Sioux Nation case, see infra note 258 and ac-
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3. Original Indian Title
Takings of land in original Indian title presents distinct
issues of legal recognition and remedy. Original or aboriginal
Indian title refers to tribal ownership antecedent to legal
relations with a European or successor power. 233 The first
American treaties with tribes involved cessions of part of a
tribe's original territory and treaty recognition of land
retained.234 Parts of other tribes' original territory were
recognized by statute or international treaty; lands of others
were simply seized by settlers. 235 Under the theory of Lone
Wolf, these distinctions would not have mattered in disputes
about takings of tribal land because that decision denied
constitutional protection to all tribal land.236 The 1930s Court
changed the law and held treaty title to be protected by the
Takings Clause, but it did not say whether protection would
include land in original title. 237
Pre-1946, special acts of Congress consenting to damages
claims were limited to causes of action specified in each
statute. Until 1929, consents to land claims were based on
ownership recognized in treaties, statutes, or executive orders,
and the courts interpreted them strictly, thus excluding claims
based on original title.238 Starting in 1929, a few statutes
allowed original title claims, and in 1945, the Court of Claims
upheld the Alcea claim and was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.239 Soon after, ICCA was passed, and its broad causes of
action were eventually interpreted to allow claims based on
companying text.
233. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.04[2].
234. See PRUCHA, supra note 24, at 226-31.
235. See id. at 62-63, 978-82. Many reservations were set aside or expanded
by executive order of the President. Their legal status is reviewed infra text ac-
companying notes 259-63.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
238. See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 49-54 (1946).
The leading example is Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S.
335 (1945) (stating that consent to claim based on treaty did not allow recovery
based on original title). The Court divided 5-4; Justice Murphy's dissent relied
strongly on the treaty canon to argue that plaintiffs should succeed under their
treaty. Id. at 362. The dissent did not address original title.
239. Alcea Band of Tillamooks v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 934 (Ct. Cl. 1945),
aff'd, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). The Court of Claims related that prior claims had failed
for lack of proof or because jurisdictional acts were limited to treaty or other rec-
ognized title. Id. at 961-65. Alcea involved unratified treaties in Oregon, making
proof easier.
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original title.240
Constitutional protection was not at issue in Alcea until
remand, when the plaintiffs sought interest on the
judgment. 24 1 On its second review, the Supreme Court rejected
the claim in a per curiam opinion that addressed the
constitutional issue in a single sentence: "[1]ooking to the
former opinions in this case, we find that none of them
expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking
under the Fifth Amendment."242
The Court squarely addressed the constitutional issue in
Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, decided in 1955.243 The
Tee-Hit-Ton tribe in Alaska claimed that a federal timber sale
condemned the timber interest in its original title land.244 The
tribe asserted that the Alaska Organic Act and other statutes
recognized its ownership, entitling it to constitutional
protection; in the alternative, it argued that its original title
was protected by the Takings Clause. 245 The Court rejected
both claims. 246
The tribe's statutory claim was an opportunity to apply the
statutory canon. However, three dissenting justices voted for
the tribe on this claim without invoking the canon, and the
majority also ignored it.247 When Congress passed the Alaska
Organic Act and other early statutes, it knew little about the
extent of Native Alaskan interests, and these acts included
240. Otoe & Missouria Tribe v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 265 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955). As this decision shows, the government con-
tested the issue vigorously. See infra note 244.
241. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 48-49 (1951).
242. Id. at 49. Professor Friedman opined that the case did not settle the tak-
ings issue. Friedman, supra note 226, at 38.
243. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
244. Id. Although the Court of Claims rejected the claim, the Supreme Court
agreed to review the conflict because a few years earlier the Ninth Circuit had
upheld another Alaskan tribe's takings claim. Id. at 275-76. The Court's opinions
in prior cases, and a dissent, had language foreshadowing the constitutional rul-
ing. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 101-07 (1949); United States v.
Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 56 (1946) (Reed, J., dissenting); Nw. Bands
of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 338-40 (1945). Like the Tee-
Hit-Ton majority, all were authored by Justice Stanley Reed, who seemed to have
a personal vendetta on the issue. See also his gratuitous denigration of the treaty
canon in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians, 324 U.S. at 353.
245. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 273, 277.
246. Id. at 277-91.
247. Id. at 291 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In 1955 the statutory canon was not
yet established. The Court had recognized it in all but three or four decisions. See
supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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general provisions preserving Native rights. 248 The majority
summarily read the statutes to preserve only whatever Native
title would later be recognized, while the dissenters said that
the Organic Act recognized Native ownership. 249
For want of a treaty or statute, Tee-Hit-Ton's
constitutional holding presented an interpretive issue beyond
the scope of the recognized canons. The Court's precedents on
the Due Process and Takings Clauses say that constitutionally
protected property interests are those recognized in state or
federal law. 250 Therefore, the constitutional holding in Tee-Hit-
Ton was either an interpretation of federal common law or of
the Constitution itself. The Court's opinion largely begged the
question by relying on the sort of circular reasoning used in
Lone Wolf: that guardianship justifies anything the
government does. 251 The policies underlying the treaty and
statutory canons should have ready application to federal
common law, but the courts have ignored the canons in that
context. 252
Tee-Hit-Ton prevented recovery of just compensation,
including interest, in the few ICCA original-title cases that
survived the minefield of government defenses. 253 For current
and future claims, the decision's practical effect was mainly in
Alaska because the statute of limitations bars most original-
title claims elsewhere, unless Congress waives the statute.
Many tribes would also face the barrier of res judicata based on
248. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279-279.
249. Id. at 277-78, 291.
250. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.5(a) (4th ed. 2008).
251. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 279-82. Professor Friedman reviewed
the history of the issue and made a strong case against the Court, suggesting that
it simply adopted the distinction ipse dixit out of fear that liability would be too
costly. Friedman, supra note 226, at 39-46. He did ignore the Court's statement in
United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) ("Extinguish-
ment of Indian title based on aboriginal possession is of course a different matter.
The power of Congress in that regard is supreme. The manner, method and time
of such extinguishment raise political not justiciable issues."). This tracked the
brief for the United States with Cohen as counsel. Id. at 341. However, the matter
was not at issue in that case. See supra text accompanying notes 183-87. Moreo-
ver, the statement can be read to refer only to the decision to extinguish, not to
liability for taking.
252. Worse, it may have been avoided to undermine tribal sovereignty. See in-
fra text accompanying note 347.
253. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. However, Alaskan ICCA
claims for fair market value of original title land, without prejudgment interest,
succeeded. E.g., Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States, 389 F.2d 778
(Ct. Cl. 1968).
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a prior claims case judgment.254 For this reason, loss of the
Tee-Hit-Ton tribe's statutory claim had practical effect similar
to loss of the constitutional issue, and failure to interpret the
statute in favor of the tribe had almost the same practical
impact as the constitutional holding. Congress resolved
Alaskan claims in the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act. 255 There was significant consultation with Natives during
the drafting and hearings on the statute, and it conveyed
substantial land holdings in kind to new Native corporations
with shares owned by Natives individually. 256 However, critics
have pointed out a number of shortcomings. 257
For most tribes, recognition of constitutional protection to
original Indian title in 1955 would have been too late to avoid
statute of limitations or res judicata defenses. On the other
hand, such recognition would have made a stronger political
case for tribes to seek new waivers from Congress. The Sioux
claim based on its treaty title illustrates both issues: new
waiver and compensation in kind rather than cash. 258
254. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. For a notorious example, see
United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890
(1989); see also Newton 1992, supra note 222, at 761-63; Caroline L. Orlando, Ab-
original Title Claims in the Indian Claims Commission: United States v. Dann
and Its Due Process Implications, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 241, 265-80 (1986).
255. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688-716 (codified as amend-
ed at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629a (2006)).
256. See James E. Torgerson, Indians Against Immigrants-Old Rivals, New
Rules: A Brief Review and Comparison of Indian Law in the Contiguous United
States, Alaska, and Canada, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 57, 72 (1989) ("Alaskan Na-
tives were deeply involved in the development and passage of ANCSA"); Arthur
Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: A
Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 132, 132-38 (1976).
257. See THOMAS R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA
NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (1985); Marilyn J. Ward Ford & Robert Rude,
ANCSA: Sovereignty and a Just Settlement of Land Claims or an Act of Deception,
15 TOURO L. REV. 479, 489 (1999) ("ANCSA did not provide wealth, land, or im-
provement in the lifestyles of Alaska Natives. Instead it divided Alaska Natives
[and] placed their lands and culture in jeopardy .... ); Newton 1994, supra note
203, at 461, 471-74. An attempt to recover damages for original title extinguished
by the statute failed based on Tee-Hit-Ton. Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v.
United States, 680 F.2d 122 (Ct. Cl. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
258. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (affirming $100
million-plus judgment for taking the Black Hills). The Sioux had lost their initial
claim based on a 1920 special consent statute but then obtained a second statute
that waived res judicata as well as immunity and limitations. Id. at 384-89. How-
ever, by the time of the 1980 judgment, the Sioux had decided that the only just
resolution was restoration of land in kind, so they refused to accept the cash.
Their judgment sits in the Treasury continuing to draw interest. See Oglala Sioux
Tribe of the Pine Ridge Indian Res. v. United States, 650 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982) (dismissing suit for land); Different Horse v. Sal-
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4. Executive Order Reservations
Many Indian reservations were established or expanded by
executive orders of presidents between 1855 and 1919.259 Of
course, the land set aside was originally Indian land, usually in
possession of the tribe for which the order reserved it and for
which original title had never been formally extinguished.
However, legal status was much improved by executive order.
An order's boundaries obviate any need to prove the extent of
original title. These reservations have full legal status for all
purposes except constitutional protection against the federal
government. 260 ICCA expressly allowed claims based on
executive orders, but the Commission and Claims Court
rejected constitutional protection. 261 That protection requires
legislative recognition, but this can be implied. 262 Under the
standard of implied recognition, aided by the statutory canon,
it is likely that all current reservations have recognized title.263
5. Damages for Breach of Trust
Issues about interpretation of federal waivers of sovereign
immunity also arise in cases claiming wrongs other than taking
land. These are commonly called breach of trust cases, and
again, the statutory canon of interpretation has often failed to
overcome federal sovereign immunity. The basis for these
claims derives from the smothering control over Indian
resources exercised by the federal Indian affairs bureaucracy
and by the U.S. Treasury. 264 When land is not taken outright,
it is often mismanaged. Proceeds for land purchases are stolen
or lost in the Treasury.265
azar, No. 09-4049, 2011 WL 3422842 (D.S.D. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying suit to reopen
the case). See generally JEFFREY OSTLER, THE LAKOTAS AND THE BLACK HILLS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR SACRED GROUND (2010).




263. See id. For some doubt on this point, see Nell Jessup Newton, At the
Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215,
1257-59 (1980). But see Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (sustaining
authority of executive order to reserve navigable waterway to tribe).
264. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). See generally
2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 17.01-17.03[2].
265. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.03[3] [b]; Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d
808, 809-11 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3497 (2010).
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Some pre-1946 special-consent cases included
mismanagement claims, with mixed success. 266 The ICCA's
broad provisions defining causes of action opened the
possibility of many kinds of claims beyond land takings, but the
Commission and courts narrowed their application. 267
Occasional Indian claims continue to be heard under special
jurisdictional acts. 268 But most current breach-of-trust claims
are made under the Tucker Act.
Two barriers have defeated most Tucker Act Indian claims.
First, the statute of limitations barred many claims. 269 Second,
other claims failed for want of a cause of action; unlike the
ICCA and earlier special consent laws, the Tucker Act does not
specify causes of action. 270 Rather, to state a claim, a litigant
must invoke a federal law or contract that "could fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the [flederal
[g]overnment." 27 1 In every case tribes argue that the federal
trust duty should satisfy that requirement, but the Supreme
Court disagrees and requires a more specific waiver of
immunity. 272 Thus, under the Tucker Act, mismanagement of
Indian allotments could not be redressed based on the
allotments' federal trust title because that title imposed no
management duties; instead, it resembles a common-law
use. 273 In another case, the trust relationship did not protect
the Navajo Nation from corrupt action by the Secretary of the
Interior regarding Navajo coal leases because the leasing
statute did not impose compensable duties. 274 In these and
266. See, e.g., Crow Nation v. United States, 81 Ct. C1. 238, 271, 281 (Ct. Cl.
1935) (claims for mismanagement and loss of funds offset by federal expendi-
tures). These claims suffered the same difficulties as land claims during that peri-
od. See supra text accompanying notes 214-18.
267. See supra text accompanying note 222.
268. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a].
269. See Steven Paul McSloy, Revisiting the "Courts of the Conqueror"- Ameri-
can Indian Claims Against the United States, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 543-82
(1994); Newton 1992, supra note 222, at 790. Professor Newton discussed Indian
claims that trust theory or other rules have tolled the statute and found very lim-
ited success. See id. at 792-800. See also Sisk, supra note 210, at 580-605 (dis-
cussing whether statutes of limitation for waivers of sovereign immunity are ju-
risdictional or function as in private litigation).
270. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 490 (2003).
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., id.
273. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542-44 (1980). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 6 (2003). For detailed review of this decision and its anteced-
ents, see Richard W. Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for Its Breach? The Sad
Saga of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. REV. 447 (1981).
274. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-514.
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other cases, invocation of the statutory canon did not yield
interpretations favorable to the Indians. However,
mismanagement of allottees' timber resource was held
compensable based on statutes committing control of their
timber to federal officials. 275 Recently, a massive suit for
mismanagement of allottees' trust funds succeeded.276
Generally, claims' success or failure turns on views of the
justices who hold the balance of power on a consistently divided
Supreme Court. 277
One must conclude that redress for the government's
wrongful dispossession or mismanagement of Indian resources
has been far short of fair compensation. A few tribes achieved
just results, but most were buried in a blizzard of
technicalities. The statutory canon was of little importance to a
process in which courts and commissioners were a greater bar-
rier than politicians; although, like politicians, the judges often
seemed motivated more by saving the Treasury than by
justice. 278
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY'S SETBACKS SINCE 1975
Tribal sovereignty has lost ground since 1975, and changes
in the Supreme Court's membership are a likely cause. In his
1968 campaign for president, Richard Nixon made the
Supreme Court's membership a prominent political issue, and
275. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
276. Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
3497 (2010). After this decision, the parties settled the claim for $3.4 billion. See
Elouise Cobell, Cobell Case Wins Final Approval in Major Victory For Native
Americans, NDN NEWS, June 21, 2011, available at http://ndnnews.com/2011/06/c
obell-case-wins-final-approval-in-major-victory-for-native-americans (last visited
Aug. 17, 2012). For details, see Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injus-
tice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L.
REV. 609 (2010-11).
277. From 1980, all Indian claims decided on the merits by the Supreme Court
have had dissents. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514 (Souter, J., dissenting); White
Mtn. Apache Tribe v. United States, 537 U.S. 465, 481 (2003) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting); Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 445 U.S. at
546 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist voted against the Indian side
in each of these cases, as well as in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371,
424 (1980).
278. This was the thrust of Professor Friedman's Judicial Protection of the Fisc
article. Friedman, supra note 226, at 30-37, 39. His main examples were ICC's
barriers to finding a taking in Fort Berthold and other cases and the footnote in
Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283 n.17 (1955), in which Justice Reed
recited the government's estimate that recognizing original title would cost nine
billion dollars, an immense sum in 1955.
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it has been one ever since. 279 Most observers agree that the
Court has changed and that Indian sovereignty has been
affected as a result.280 Tribes successfully defended sovereignty
over their members in major decisions between 1959 and 1987,
and this aspect of tribal sovereignty remains secure. 281 But in
other battlegrounds, reviewed here, tribes have had either
mixed or very little success. The canons were invoked and
discussed in every case. The burning question for Indian
nations is whether the modern Court has dishonored the
canons.
The first part below explains the Supreme Court's mixed
record in lawsuits contesting the boundaries of Indian
reservations within which tribes can exercise sovereign powers.
The boundary issue is largely settled, as all or nearly all
possible contests have been decided, with some decisions
favoring tribes but important ones going against them. Though
regularly invoked, the statutory canon had little effect in these
cases.
This section's second part addresses the Supreme Court's
controversial decisions divesting tribes of most sovereign
authority over nonmembers in tribal territory. The decisions
that denied tribal authority over civil claims, and over Indians
who did not belong to the governing tribe, recited false history
and ignored precedents.
One reason the Court recited for the divesting decisions is
its concern for the civil rights of nonmembers who cannot vote
279. When running for election, Nixon promised to appoint "strict construction-
ists" to the Supreme Court. Except for Ford, every Republican nominee since has
done the same. Beginning with the 1980 campaign, abortion became a major fo-
cus, with Republicans and Democrats dueling over whether Roe V. Wade should be
overturned. As a result, the confirmation process became much longer. See Strict
Constructionism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strictconstructionism
(last visited Aug. 16, 2012); Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abor-
tion Teaches Us About American Politics, 94 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 304-09, 315-
18 (1994) (book review essay).
280. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 580 (2008) ("federal Indian law as practiced before the Su-
preme Court is in serious normative decline . . . ."); Bethany R. Berger, Liberalism
and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 813, 814, 817 (2006)
(conservative justices favor states' rights over Indians'; liberals favor individual
over tribal rights based on "ignorance of history and short-sighted, even illiberal,
failure of perception"); Skibine, supra note 10, at 2-3 (summarizing views of sev-
eral writers); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pur-
suit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 267, 316-52 (2001) (discussing views of justices in detail in relation to liberal
and conservative labels).
281. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 4.01[1][b]-[fl.
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in tribal elections. This section's third part argues that this is a
mistaken analysis of the subject.
A. Reservation Diminishment
In modern contests over boundaries of Indian reservations,
results have been mixed, and the statutory canon has had little
effect. The territorial extent of tribal sovereignty depends
mostly on reservation boundaries. These originally coincided
with land reserved for exclusive Indian occupancy or
ownership, making the determination easy. 282 But the
allotment laws opened part or all of many reservations to non-
Indian entry and settlement. 283 The first problem caused by
these openings was determining their effects on criminal laws
applicable to Indian country. Lacking legislative guidance,
courts reached conflicting decisions 284 until a 1948 statute
resolved many issues. 285 The statute provides that all land
within reservation boundaries is Indian country regardless of
ownership. 286 When active tribal sovereignty revived after
1959, litigants began to dispute whether allotment and opening
had abolished reservation status of opened areas. 287 In its first
two decisions on the issue, the Supreme Court noted that the
opening statutes said nothing about reservation boundaries
and held the reservations at issue to be intact. 288 One opinion
found the relevant law clear, the other insisted on clear
congressional intent to diminish.289
In 1975, the Court's third decision on reservation
boundaries retreated from requiring clear intent of Congress to
diminish. 290 In DeCoteau v. District County Court, the Court
held that an ambiguous statute had abolished the Lake
282. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
283. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 1.04.
284. See 1982 COHEN, supra note 16, at 29-34.
285. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). On issues the statute resolved, see 1982 COHEN,
supra note 16, at 29-34.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a).
287. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Supt. Of Wash. State
Pen., 368 U.S. 351 (1962); DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S.
463 (1984); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998), discussed infra notes 288-310 and accompanying text.
288. Mattz, 412 U.S. at 481; Seymour, 368 U.S. at 351.
289. Seymour found the statute clear. 368 U.S. at 355-59. Mattz insisted on
clear intent. 412 U.S. at 504-05.
290. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 425.
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Traverse Reservation in South Dakota. 291 The 1891 statute
ratified an agreement with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux
without material change. 292 It was therefore a treaty
substitute, and review should have been based on the Indians'
reasonable expectations about its effects. The Court did rely on
the agreement to distinguish the two earlier decisions, which
had been imposed on unconsenting tribes. 293 It also
distinguished them based on payment: Lake Traverse tribes
were paid immediately from the Treasury, while tribes in the
prior cases were paid only by proceeds of sales to settlers.294
This seemed to be a makeweight. When a tribe cedes an entire
territory, it is reasonable to imply that the ceded land ceases to
be a reservation regardless of the form of payment. When
instead it cedes only noncontiguous parts of the land in a
reservation, as at Lake Traverse, it is equally difficult to
understand how the form of payment should imply abolition of
reservation status.
The Court's holding was grounded on the operative part of
the agreement that appeared verbatim in the statute: The
"Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United
States all their right, title, and interest in and to all the
unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation . . . ."295
But these words said nothing about abolishing the reservation,
and the Court made no effort to ascertain the Indians'
understanding of their import.296 Instead, the opinion
purported to rely on the statute's words, legislative history, and
surrounding circumstances. 297 It claimed to honor the statutory
canon but decided that the quoted words were "precisely
suited" to abolish the reservation. 298
Two years later, the Court held that three similar laws
291. Id.
292. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, §§ 26-29, 26 Stat. 989, 1035-39. This was the
annual Indian appropriations act that included ratification of seven allotment
agreements.
293. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 445.
296. The Court quoted statements by Indian parties to the agreement from
which one might have determined their understanding that the reservation would
be abolished, but the question is uncertain in the absence of a systematic effort to
examine it. See id. at 433-35. The dissenting justices were content to point out
that the language relied on by the majority was ambiguous and thus insufficient.
Id. at 463.
297. Id. at 445.
298. Id.
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diminished the Rosebud Sioux Reservation. 299 The tribe made
allotment and opening agreements with the government, but
the Court again failed to require that the Indians'
understanding be determined. 300 However, the tribe claimed
that Congress had not relied on proper agreements, so that the
statutes were imposed. 301 The Court accepted the tribes' claim,
gave brief obeisance to the statutory canon, and then relied on
statutory language that matched the 1975 case. 302 The ambig-
uous language had hardened into magic words, as the
dissenters protested. 303
However, the Court's next decision on the issue
unanimously held that a 1908 allotment and opening statute
imposed on two tribes had not effected reservation
diminishment. 304 The statute lacked the magic language relied
on in the prior cases, but it expressly referred to the
reservations as "diminished" and their opened areas as part of
the public domain. 305 Ten years later, the Court held that a
statute imposed on a tribe that had resoundingly refused to
agree to its terms had diminished its reservation because it
referred to the opened area as part of the public domain. 306 A
1998 decision was nearly a reprise of the 1975 case: a statute
ratified an agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe that
included the magic, ambiguous language the Court had held to
299. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
300. See id. at 587-88. Language quoted by the Court again indicated that
such an examination might have found that the tribe had understood that its res-
ervation would be diminished. See id. at 592-93.
301. This claim had a complex history that the Court did not bother to sort out.
Art. XII of the 1868 Sioux Treaty required consent of three-fourths of adult male
members for further land cessions. 15 Stat. 635, 639. The 1889 agreement with
the Sioux that divided the 1868 reservation into six smaller parts including Rose-
bud and ceded the rest, was allegedly agreed to by three-fourths of adult male
members (though with much evidence of duress). It provided for allotment but
said it should be agreed to by majority vote. Another section preserved consistent
parts of the 1868 treaty. Congress ratified the agreement without material
change. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888, §§ 8, 9, 12, 19. Allotment at
Rosebud began with a 1901 pact that was agreed to by three-fourths if adult
males but required immediate cash purchase. Congress balked and refused to rat-
ify. A 1903 agreement providing for payment out of proceeds from settlers' pur-
chases was agreed to by majority vote short of three-fourths. Similar events led to
the other two statutes at issue. The tribe argued that all three laws were imposed
without consent, and the Court accepted that claim as a premise for its decision.
See Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 590-98.
302. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 586-98.
303. Id. at 618-19.
304. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
305. Id. at 474-76.
306. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1994).
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be "precisely suited" to diminishment. 307 The Court
unanimously held the reservation abolished. 308 The Tribe
argued that provisions of the Yankton agreement not found in
the Lake Traverse agreement implied that the Indians had not
understood that their reservation would be abolished. 309 The
Court rejected that argument, but the claim at least led to a
discussion in some detail of how the Indians had understood
the agreement. 310
Normal rules of statutory interpretation cannot reconcile
these decisions. From 1973, every opinion purported to rely on
the statutory canon. When the statutes were treaty substitutes,
the statutory canon was the wrong focus, but in any case, very
similar laws were interpreted inconsistently. As others have
observed, the record of subsequent treatment of the opened
area is the only factor that makes sense of all the cases.3 11
Reservation areas held undiminished had continuing Indian
and federal agency presence similar to other reservations.
Those held to be diminished or abolished had much less Indian
and federal presence and had been assumed not to be
reservations for decades. The cases seem to rest on a rule of
collective laches: when no one challenged the effect of an
allotment and opening statute for many decades, latter-day
contests were barred by the passage of time. 312 The Court did
interpret ambiguities in the records of subsequent treatment in
the Indians' favor. But the canons had little direct role in
interpreting the agreements and statutes.
307. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 344-45 (1998).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 345-49.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism:
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE
L.J. 1, 24-27 (1999).
312. In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), the
Oneidas purchased land within the area of their 1788 treaty reservation. The land
had been wrongfully sold in 1807, and the reservation had been treated as abol-
ished since 1805. The Court held that laches prevented restoration of reservation
status to the purchased land. Id. at 217-20. The Court cited and relied on the di-
minishment cases, but the issue was different because none had involved land
owned by a tribe or held in trust for Indians. See id. at 215. For criticism, see Sa-
rah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation: A Regretful Postscript to the
Taxation Chapter in Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV.
5 (2005).
49
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
B. Tribal Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers
The canons of interpretation have had severe tests in
recent contests about tribal authority over nonmembers in
tribal territory. In a series of decisions since 1978, the Supreme
Court has decided that tribes have very little sovereignty over
non-Indians and over Indians who do not belong to the
governing tribe. These decisions have generated a flood of
critical scholarship. 313 My focus is on application of the canons
in this context.
The first, and most difficult, issue decided by the Court
involved criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. And it arose
under quite unfavorable facts. The Suquamish Tribe in
Washington claimed criminal jurisdiction to punish non-Indian
offenders. 314 Defendants argued that tribal authority was
preempted by a federal statute providing for federal criminal
jurisdiction over interracial crimes in Indian country,
commonly called the Indian Country Crimes Act. 315 The
statute's terms preserve concurrent tribal jurisdiction over
Indian defendants but do not say anything about tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 316 The terms also say nothing
about state jurisdiction, but the courts have consistently
interpreted the statute to preempt state authority over
interracial crimes by non-Indians, and traditional norms
313. See, e.g., Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's
(Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623 (2011); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 391, 391 (2007/2008) ("There is no question that in the last thirty
years, the Supreme Court has presided over an unprecedented assault on the sov-
ereignty of Indian tribes."); Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Non-
sense: Toward a New Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 659-
60 (2006); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf,
38 TULSA L. REV. 5, 33 (2002) ("As the years have gone by, the jurisprudential
spread between the Court and the scholarly community has become a gulf that
now may be impassible."); Getches, supra note 280, at 267 ("The Supreme Court
has made radical departures from the established principles of Indian law.").
314. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 193 (1978). The Court
recited that the reservation had been opened, and its population was 2,928 non-
Indians and 50 Suquamish members. Id. at 193 n.1.
315. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). The statute evolved from laws passed between
1790 and 1854 and from some treaty provisions. See 1982 COHEN, supra note 16,
at 287-88.
316. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ("This section shall not extend to ... any Indian commit-
ting any offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of
the tribe . . . ."). This appears to give exclusive authority to the tribe or feds,
whichever acts first.
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avoided concurrent jurisdiction over serious crimes. 317 Limited
judicial precedents barred tribal authority as well. 318 Thus, the
statute could have been read to preempt tribal power-an
interesting test of the canons. 319 Instead, the Supreme Court
held that the tribe had no jurisdiction based on an expansive
and radical theory.320 Largely ignoring the statute, it claimed
317. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 253-54, 271 (1913).
Donnelly was a non-Indian convicted of murdering an Indian on a reservation.
Jurisdiction was based on predecessors of section 1152, and the Court sustained
the conviction after extensive review of the statute's application. See id. at 268-
72. The Court had no occasion to consider whether jurisdiction was concurrent,
but counsel for both sides made arguments that assumed either the United States
or the state had exclusive jurisdiction. See id. at 253-54. As the Court noted,
crimes by non-Indians against non-Indian victims had been held subject to state
jurisdiction exclusive of federal. Id. at 271. In Williams v. United States, 327 U.S.
711, 714 (1946), the Court stated in dicta that federal jurisdiction under the stat-
ute is exclusive of state jurisdiction. No judicial opinion has even hinted that ju-
risdiction might be concurrent.
318. The only reported decision on tribal jurisdiction was Ex parte Kenyon, 14
F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878). The court granted habeas corpus to a non-
Indian in Cherokee custody, stating: "[T]o give [the Cherokee] court jurisdiction of
the person of an offender, such offender must be an Indian, and the one against
whom the offence is committed must also be an Indian. Rev. St. 1873, § 2146 [cod-
ified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1152]." Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. at 355. Be-
cause there was an alternative holding, this may have been dicta. The court's
statement that the victim must be Indian was wrong; the statute clearly preserves
concurrent tribal authority when the accused is Indian and the victim is not.
When both accused and victim are Indian, the statute preserves exclusive tribal
jurisdiction, so the court's error may reflect the general assumption that jurisdic-
tion ought to be exclusive. A Supreme Court dictum referred to the statute's effect
on tribal authority. Interpreting a Cherokee treaty to reserve exclusive tribal ju-
risdiction over an alleged crime by a Cherokee, the Court stated,
The general object of these statutes [predecessors of 18 U.S.C. § 1152] is
to vest in the courts of the [Cherokee] nation jurisdiction of all controver-
sies between Indians, or where a member of the nation is the only party
to the proceeding, and to reserve to the courts of the United States juris-
diction of all actions to which its own citizens are parties on either side.
Ex parte Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107, 116 (1891). This statement repeated the Kenyon
error about crimes by Indians against non-Indian victims; it appears again to re-
flect the background assumption that jurisdiction ought to be exclusive. Oliphant,
435 U.S. at 209, also quoted Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 147 (1810) (". . . the limitation upon their sovereignty amounts to
the right of governing every person within their limits except themselves."). This
remark had no relevance to the case and was not joined by any other justice.
319. The Court of Appeals briefly discussed and rejected the claim. Oliphant v.
Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 131 (1978). The
original Cohen treatise stated that, aside from specific rights in early treaties,
tribes lacked authority to prosecute non-Indians, but Cohen did not analyze the
issue. 1941 COHEN, supra note 13, at 148. One scholar reviewed the issue exten-
sively and concluded that the statute was not intended to preempt tribal authority
over non-Indians. See Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole
Is Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 418-23 (1993).
320. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-11.
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that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been implicitly
taken from tribes upon their incorporation into the United
States. 32 1 The opinion's main theme was to argue that federal
authorities had always assumed tribes had no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 322 Of course, such an assumption
could have been based on the statute. The Court also said that
tribal authority to punish would have raised procedural
concerns that were reflected in traditional assumptions. 323
Scholars have shown that the Court's collection of assumptions
was selective and ignored contrary evidence, 324 but no member
of the Court has questioned the decision.
Three years later, Montana v. United States325 extended
the new theory of implicit divestiture to civil jurisdiction. At
issue there was the Crow Tribe's authority to regulate hunting
and fishing on its treaty reservation, which had been allotted
and opened. 326 The Court's analysis divided the issue based on
land ownership. 327 For Indian trust land, the Crow Tribe could
regulate civilly based on its power of exclusion.328 For land
owned by non-Indians or by the State of Montana, general
tribal jurisdiction was implicitly divested by incorporation. 329
This time there was no attempt to claim that divesting had
been assumed all along; almost all reported precedents had
sustained tribal authority in civil matters. The Court
recognized these decisions but crafted a special category of
retained tribal power to distinguish them: "[a] tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
321. Id.
322. Id. at 197-206. This claim was previewed in the dissenting opinion of
then-Judge Anthony Kennedy's dissent in the Court of Appeals. Oliphant, 544
F.2d at 1014-19. Terms of the early treaties that defined Indian sovereignty
yielded tribes' foreign affairs powers. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1831). Until Oliphant, powers internal to Indian country had been re-
tained unless preempted by Congress. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 4.02[3][a).
323. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12.
324. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Non-
members in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1056 (2005); Philip P.
Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1161-63 (1990); Maxfield, supra note
319, at 418-23.
325. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
326. Id. at 547-48.
327. Id. at 551-55.
328. Id. at 554-56.
329. Id. at 563-64.
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contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 330 The opinion also
stated that tribes may retain additional power to protect
essential tribal interests. 331
As was the case for criminal jurisdiction, federal statutes
provided a means to address the case in less radical fashion.
The Court of Appeals had followed that course, holding that the
allotment and opening laws deprived the tribe of authority to
regulate hunting and fishing on fee land owned by non-Indians,
but not generally.332
Implicit divestiture's third casualty was tribal jurisdiction
over Indians belonging to other tribes. After several years of
dicta and indirect holdings, the Court applied the theory of
implicit divestiture to deprive tribes of criminal jurisdiction in
the 1990 decision in Duro v. Reyna.333 The opinion claimed the
same historical pattern as in Oliphant,334 but this factual claim
was close to fraudulent. The Indian Country Crimes Act that
was the backdrop for Oliphant had always applied to all
Indians, not just to those locally enrolled. Thus, the Duro Court
rewrote the tribal jurisdiction clauses of the statute. 335 The
Court revealed its actual reasons later in the opinion. It said
that whatever was done in the past, Indians are now American
330. Id. at 565-66.
331. Id. at 566 (emphasis added). This dictum turned out to be meaningless.
See infra text accompanying note 341.
332. See id. at 550. The Court of Appeals had held that the tribe owned the
beds and banks of the Big Horn River, but the Supreme Court reversed, so the
lower court did not explore the jurisdictional implications of that factor either. See
id. at 556-57.
333. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). Prior to 1978, judicial precedents of all kinds distin-
guished between Indians and non-Indians. For the first time a Court opinion
shifted the distinction to tribal members and nonmembers in United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). No issue in the case depended on the distinc-
tion, so it was a gratuitous dictum on an issue that was not briefed. Next, a 1980
civil case held that nonmember Indians were subject to state jurisdiction when
members were not. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 161 (1980). Briefing and analysis were minimal. The distinction
arose randomly in the 1981 Montana opinion discussed above; again it was not at
issue and not briefed. See supra text accompanying notes 325-32.
334. Duro, 495 U.S. at 688-92.
335. See supra text accompanying note 316. In United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.
567, 573 (1846), the Court said that the provision preserving tribal jurisdiction
over Indians "does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race generally, of
the family of Indians; and it intended to leave them both, as regarded their own
tribe, and other tribes also, to be governed by Indian usages and customs." The
Duro opinion quoted this language, but (perhaps deliberately?) misapplied it to
the statute's imposition of federal jurisdiction rather than to its preservation of
tribal jurisdiction over crimes by Indians. 495 U.S. at 689.
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citizens and entitled to the civil rights of citizens. 336 (Was the
Court saying noncitizen Indians had none?) The opinion
invoked the democratic deficit by pointing out that
nonmembers cannot vote in tribal elections. 337 The Court said
that tribal membership is voluntary, so members consent to
tribal authority. 338 True, but membership is equally voluntary
for members of other tribes. An individual can surrender tribal
membership and its federal law status. 339 In any event,
Congress disagreed with the Court's revision and restored the
traditional interpretation. 340
Having established implicit divestiture, the focus shifted to
defining the scope of civil jurisdiction left to tribes by the
Montana theory--consensual relations, essential tribal
interests, and exclusion from trust land. As scholars have
detailed, the Court has read all three categories narrowly, and
its expressed concern with the inability of nonmembers to vote
in tribal elections has spread to become a major factor in civil
as well as in criminal matters. 341
At least on vital economic issues, the decisions are mixed.
The Court sustained tribal power to tax lessees of tribal
property and to control hunting and fishing on trust land free
336. Duro, 495 U.S. at 692-93.
337. Id. at 693-94.
338. Id. at 693.
339. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 3.03[3]; cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535, 554 n.24 (1974) ("The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group con-
sisting of 'Indians'; instead, it applies only to members of 'federally recognized'
tribes. This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as 'Indians."').
340. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). A constitutional attack on the validity of the
override failed but did not fully resolve all issues raised. United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004) ("[W]e need not, and we shall not, consider the merits of
Lara's due process claim. . . . Like the due process argument, however, [his] equal
protection argument is simply beside the point[;] therefore we do not address it.").
The statute applies only to criminal law. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). Its possible applica-
tion to issues of civil jurisdiction has not been judicially resolved. For discussion of
later cases on the due process and equal protection issues, see Matthew L. M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 579, 630-34
(2008).
341. See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sover-
eignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 651-53 (2003); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dia-
logic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for
Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); David H. Getches, Be-
yond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States Rights, Color-Blind
Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001).
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of state interference. 342 The Court also crafted an awkward but
effective rule to bar state taxation of non-Indians participating
in other forms of economic development on reservations. 343 But
changing Court membership betrayed that rule to allow state
taxation of oil and gas production from tribal trust land.344 And
a non-Indian business on its own land can cater to tourists
attracted to Navajo Indian country free of any tribal tax.345
However, the Court interpreted ambiguous federal laws to
allow tribal gambling enterprises to operate free of state
interference, a decision which led to today's tribal casinos. 346
C. Divestiture, Democracy, and the Canons
As the previous section relates, since 1978 the Supreme
Court has crafted a new doctrine of implied divestiture to
deprive tribes of most jurisdiction over nonmembers in tribal
territory, and it has relied on democracy as an important policy
reason for its decisions. The canons have been shunted aside.
However, the Court did not spell out the formal basis for
implied divestiture. Because recognition of tribal sovereignty
derives from treaties, the new doctrine could be based on a
theory of implied cession by the Indians in the treaties. One
scholarly view is that divestiture was based on federal common
law-with no text to interpret, common law would provide a
possible way to avoid the canons. 347 Or perhaps divestiture was
simply a matter of conquest. If the former, it is impossible to
square the treaty implication with any fair rule of treaty
interpretation, and none of the divestiture decisions made an
342. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (sustaining
tribal taxation of mineral lessees); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324 (1983) (sustaining exclusive tribal control of hunting and fishing on
tribal land).
343. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144-52
(1980) (barring state taxation of transactions between tribes and others involving
development of "reservation value").
344. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). Only one
justice was common to the majorities in Cotton and in White Mountain Apache.
345. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
346. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
The Court's complex opinion alluded to the statutory canon, mainly by reference
to Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-14.
Congress reacted to the decision by passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721 (2006)). See generally 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, §§ 12.01-.07.
347. See Singer, supra note 341, at 650 n.32. But see supra text accompanying
note 252 (arguing that there should be a canon for federal common law).
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attempt to do so. To that extent, those who accuse the Court of
abandoning the canons, including dissenting justices, have a
powerful case. And of course, conquest is supposed to be a
legislative power, not judicial. If the theory supporting implied
divestiture is an interpretation of the Constitution, we ought to
be told the reasoning for that interpretation.
Whatever the theory, the Court's invocation of democracy
to create and extend divestiture is misplaced. As explained
above, when Congress imposes laws on Indians in Indian
country, it acts without normal voter restraint, a strong reason
to require that ambiguities in these statutes be interpreted in
favor of Indians and tribes.348 When federal Indian country
laws regulate nonmembers of tribes, there is a similar lack of
direct voter restraint. Until the Court's modern takeover,
relations between tribes and nonmembers were regulated by
Congress. One might argue that nonmembers lack the political
authority to obtain a fair hearing in Congress, but examination
of the question should show this claim to be incorrect. Tribal
jurisdiction is regularly and vigorously opposed by state
governments, which have significant influence in Congress. 349
Thus, there is no evidence that nonmembers in Indian country
have been neglected by Congress.
The Court has deployed the divestiture theory to create a
novel set of rules governing relations between tribes and non-
members that it considers appropriate. It has effectively shifted
primary lawmaking on this subject from Congress to itself, an
institution with far less political accountability than Congress.
The Court has often said that the Constitution commits Indian
policy to Congress. 350 It should restore that rule.
CONCLUSION
The Indian treaty canon is firmly grounded in the basic
rules for interpretation of treaties and contracts. The Supreme
Court has dishonored it in two major instances: delayed
recognition of tribal land ownership and implicit divestiture of
tribal sovereignty over nonmembers. In many other matters,
the canon has served well to preserve tribal resources and
348. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48.
349. Many decisions cited supra in Parts II.B, and III.B, and supra notes 343-
46 involved state governments opposing Indian sovereignty as parties or amici, or
both.
350. See 2005 COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.02[1]-[2].
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sovereignty. Notably, it helped to establish the trust
relationship between Indian nations and the United States.
The Indian statutory canon derives from the treaties and
the trust relationship and should have additional support from
the lack of political restraint on Congress's broad power over
Indian country. Its application to general federal statutes could
be improved by considering whether a statute peculiarly
impacts Indian country and the related question of political
restraint. The statutory canon's major failure has been in the
Court's crabbed and picky interpretations of statutes intended
to redress federal wrongs.
Both canons have been notably more successful for Indian
rights when opponents were states or private interests and less
so when tribes challenged the feds. Historically, whatever
policy federal authorities chose to support, for or against
Indian interests, has usually prevailed. Since 1975, the pattern
has changed dramatically. The government has sided with
tribes on most major controversies, in particular in contests
about reservation diminishment and about tribal authority
over nonmembers. 351 The Court's response was to seize for
itself the dominant policy-setting role. Tribes are addressing
the role reversal by seeking aid of Congress against a hostile
Court.352
351. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 646 (2001); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981);
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
352. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 340.
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